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Editors' Summary: In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that regulations that deprive a landowner of economically 
beneficial use of land are compensable under the Fifth Amendment unless the 
regulation in question either prevents a nuisance or is part of a state's "back-
ground principles" of property law. While nuisance law is fairly well under-
stood, the second exception to the rule of compensation is not. This Article ex-
amines the law of custom and the public trust doctrine and describes the extent 
to which they have been applied in the common law, both in England and in the 
United States. The author notes that should public trust and customary law be-
come, as some courts have suggested, background principles of state property 
law, the Lucas" categorical rule" of compensation could be significantly lim-
ited in scope, leaving affected landowners with no Fifth Amendment recourse. 
I n 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court set out its now-famous "categorical rule" on regulatory takings in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council. l From that date onward, 
any regulation that leaves a landowner without any "eco-
nomically beneficial use" of land is a taking, requiring 
compensation under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amend-
ment. The landowner recei ves compensation regardless of 
the circumstances under which the landowner acquired 
the land or the reason the government gives for imposing 
the regulation. 
Two exceptions, however, exist to this "categorical rule": 
(1) if the regulation prevents a nuisance, or (2) if the regula-
tion is part of a state's background principles of property 
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1. 505 U.S. 1003,22 ELR 21104 (1992). 
law.2 The first presents very little difficulty. The law ofnui-
sance is full and comprehensive, as well as comprehensible. 
Even the nonlawyer has a pretty good idea of what consti-
tutes a nuisance. Leaving nothing to chance, the Court pro-
vided us with two examples: constructing a power plant on 
an earthquake fault line and filling part of a lake bed so as to 
increase flood damage to one's neighbor. 3 
With regard to the second, the "background principles of 
state property law," the Court failed to give so much as a 
hint, let alone an example, of what it had in mind. Commen-
tary following Lucas suggested applicable background 
principles emanating from comprehensive state statutes4 to 
legislative declarations of property. Nonetheless, it is more 
than likely that the Court had something more fundamental 
in mind, given the language in the decision deriding creative 
legislative purpose-writing and the ease with which legisla-
tures convert benefit-creation to harm-prevention, the for-
mer requiring compensation and the latter allegedly not re-
quiring compensation. Certainly, the few cases that attempt 
to excuse total takings in whole or in part on the Lucas 
2. [d. at 1020-32,22 ELR at 21108-11. 
3. See id. at 1029,22 ELR at 21111. 
4. ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE ch. 14 (1999). See 
also M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148,25 ELR 20600 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding in part that a state statute restricting the 
mining of coal to increase what the owner had to leave in the ground 
was a background principle of state property law; Hanziken v. 
Fong, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994) (holding a state statute requir-
ing a Native American burial mound to be left undisturbed, thereby 
denying the landowner a building permit for development on farm-
land, was a background principle of state property law under 
Lucas, even though the statute predated the purchase of the prop-
erty by a mere 10 years). 
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"background principles" exception go beyond such simplis-
tic declarations.5 
Although the Court provided no explicit guidance in de-
fining background principles of state property law, at least 
two areas, the subjects of this Article, come readily to mind: 
the law of custom6 and the law of public trust.7 Both are 
rooted in a common principle stated by the Lucas Court: 
whether nuisance or background principle, the restriction is 
part of the landowner's title "to begin with."s Cognizable 
analogues exist. Property owners often acquire fee simple 
interests subject to the interests of another, such as ease-
ments, profits, and licenses. While most of these kinds of in-
terests are generally recorded interests, readily ascertain-
able from a certificate or chain of title, some are not. Pre-
scriptive easements are one such example. Restrictive cove-
nants are another. Most of these rights are personal. Virtu-
ally no case provides for easements in favor of the public as 
a whole, or a prescriptive right in favor of a large class of 
people. Custom and the public trust doctrine, however, 
are different. 
Customary rights inhere in at least an entire definable 
community, although usually to use a particular parcel of 
land rather than all land similarly situated. Land impressed 
with a public trust extends further yet, giving the public cer-
tain rights over water or waterfront land-again usually a 
particular parcel or waterway, although increasingly an en-
tire section thereof-rather than a discrete segment. Under 
both theories, the landowner may not necessarily know in 
advance of such a customary or public trust right unless 
someone asserts it. Moreover, neither a recording nor a 
Torrens System is usually of any help, unless a title insur-
ance company notes possible exceptions in its policies, as in 
5. For nuisance exceptions, see Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 
P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding mining company had no 
right to degrade the environment at one of its mining sites under Col-
orado nuisance law); M & J Coal Co., 47 F.3d at 1148,25 ELR at 
20600 (holding coal company had no right to conduct nuisance-like 
activities while surface mining in West Virginia). For a background 
principles exception with nuisance overtones, see Colorado Dep't of 
Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (holding 
federal statutes restricting the disposition of uranium mine tailings 
fell within the background principles exception so as to deny a land-
owner use of a 61-acre parcel, even though the applicable statutes 
were enacted after the landowner acquired the property). See also 
TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY 
TAKINGS AFTER Dolan and Lucas 2 (David L. Callies ed., 1996). For 
a collection of recent exemption cases (and a summary of recent 
takings law generally), see MELTZ ET AL., supra note 4, atch. 14 and 
David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How 
Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central 
to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999). 
6. For a thorough analysis of custom, including its application to 
takings, see David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Cus-
tom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 1375 
(1996) and Paul Sullivan, Traditional and Customary Revolutions: 
The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawaii, 20 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 99 (1999). For recent analysis of customs and public 
trust in the context of exceptions to the Lucas categorical rule on reg-
ulatory takings, see Callies, supra note 5, at 558-62; MELTZ, supra 
note 4, at ch. 14; James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion and 
the Takings Clause: How to Save Beaches Without Hurting Property 
Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1361-83 (1998); and Marc R. Poirier, 
Regulatory Takings, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRACI1CE GUIDE (1999). 
7. See COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d ed. 1997); JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., 
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMER-
ICA'S CoASTS (1994). 
8. Lucas, supra note 1, 505 U.S. at 1027, 22 ELR at 21110. 
Hawaii with respect to customary native rights. This raises 
the danger posed by John Chipman Gray concerning the 
growth of a new class of "perpetuities" which no one has the 
power to abate, clouding titles more or less forever. 9 These 
critical jurisprudential issues aside, the following section 
addresses the basic elements of public trust and customary 
law. Should they become, as a few courts suggest, accepted 
background principles of state property law, public trust and 
customary law will become exceptions to the Lucas categor-
ical rule that a taking of all economically beneficial use by 
government regulation requires compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Custom, Background Principles, and Takings 
If custom is to represent a background principle, thereby 
shielding a custom-based land use regulation from takings 
challenges, it is useful to understand the commonly used 
definition of custom. What courts have traditionally done 
with assertions of customary rights provides some guid-
ance. Given the courts' increasing reliance on Blackstonian 
principles of custom, an exposition of what that English cus-
tom meant is critical. Finally, an assessment of what courts 
today are doing with such Blackstonian custom is both im-
portant and troubling. 
Early U.S. Cases 
Until recently, one could fairly characterize the U.S. judicial 
reception to custom as a source of law as decidedly chilly. 
Dealing mostly with easements, the few early decisions 
found little, jurisprudentially or philosophically, to attract 
them to the English doctrine of custom. Due in part to the 
prevalence of recording systems early in the history of the 
country, unrecorded clouds on title based on immemorial 
custom would be anathema. As the legendary John 
Chipman Gray so aptly commented in his definitive treatise 
on the rule against perpetuities: 
The objection which exists to allowing profits a prendre 
by custom really applies, though in a less degree, to al-
lowing easements by custom .... In a country like most 
parts of America, where a population, sparsely scattered 
at first, has rapidly increased in density, such rights 
might become very oppressive. The clog that they would 
put on the use and transfer of land would far outweigh 
any advantage that could be acquired from them. Espe-
cially it should be remembered that they cannot be re-
leased, for no inhabitant, or body of inhabitants, is enti-
tled to speak for future inhabitants. Such rights form per-
petuities of the most objectionable character. lO 
As one might expect, difficulty arose with the term "imme-
morial." The case law best demonstrates this difficulty. 11 
"[Alt this day and in this age, in a government like ours, 
there can be little need of a resort to such a source as custom 
for legal sanction."12 Furthermore, 
The political and legal institutions of Connecticut have 
from the first differed in essential particulars from those 
9. See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPE-
TUITIES (1942). 
10. Id. §586. 
II. Bederman, supra note 6, at 1398; see also Sullivan, supra note 6. 
12. Delaplanev. Crenshaw & Fisher, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 457, 475 (1860). 
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of England. Feudalism never existed here. There were no 
manors or manorial rights. A recording system was early 
set up, and has been consistently maintained, calculated 
to put on paper, for perpetual preservation and public 
knowledge, the sources of all titles to or [e]ncumbrances 
affecting real estate. Nor have we all the political subdi-
visions of lands which are found in England ... a city, 
county, town, hamlet, burgh, viii, manor, honor, or hun-
dred .... Most of these tenus denote fonus of communi-
ties that are unknown in this state. Under our statute of 
limitations, also, rights of way may be established by a 
shorter user than that required by the English law. 13 
Finally, a New Jersey court refused to permit inhabitants of 
a town an easement to reach a riverbank, based on custom. 
[I]f [this] custom ... is to prevail according to the com-
mon law notion of it, these lots must lie open forever to 
the surprise of unsuspecting owners, and to the curtailing 
[of] commerce, in its more advanced state, of the accom-
modation of docks and wharves, when perhaps a tenth 
part of the lots now open would be all sufficient as water-
ing places; a principle of such extensive operation ought 
not to be strained beyond the limits assigned to it in law. 
If [the] public convenience requires high[]ways to 
church, school, mill, market or water, they are obtainable 
in a much more direct and rational manner under [] stat-
ute than by way of immemorial usage and custom.14 
Other courts simply found that the "immemorial" feature 
could not transfer to America. 15 
A few states adopted some form of customary law, even 
though a close examination indicates less than a full em-
brace. In Galveston v. Menard,I6 the Texas Supreme Court 
noted only the possibility of vesting a property right by im-
memorial custom, but refused both to apply it in the case be-
fore it or to extend its application to Texas. In Waters v. 
Lilley,I7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted 
that the right to fish, a right claimed by custom on another's 
land, was a profit and not an easement which would have 
made it impossible to claim as a custom in England. A sub-
sequent Massachusetts case, however, confirmed the poten-
tial existence of customary easements without specifically 
finding one in that case. 18 
In two New Hampshire cases, the court initially refused 
claims of customary rights to enter private property to carry 
away sand and to collect seaweed on the grounds that both 
were profits to which the law of custom could not apply 
(forcing plaintiffs to rely upon prescriptive rights ).19 But the 
New Hampshire court finally made explicit this implied rec-
ognition of the possibility of an easement through custom in 
Knowles v. Dow.20 "[U]nexplained and uncontradicted [tes-
timony] is sufficient to warrant a jury in finding the exis-
tence of an immemorial custom" even if only for something 
more than 20 years.21 More recently, Idaho recognized that 
13. Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99 (Conn. 1905). 
14. Ackennan v. Shelp, 8 NJ.L. 125, 130-31 (1825). 
15. See. e.g., Harris v. Carson, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 632, 638 (1836); 
Ackerman, supra note 14; Delaplane, supra note 12. 
16. 23 Tex. 349 (\859). 
17. 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 145 (1826). 
18. See Jones v. Percival, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 485 (1827). 
19. See Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 
524 (1845). 
20. 22 N.H. 387 (1851). 
21. [d. 
the law of custom had limited acceptance in the state, but re-
fused to permit the establishment of such a right unless all of 
Blackstone's seven criteria were met.22 Finding six of the 
seven missing, the court further noted that over a half-cen-
tury of use was not "time immemorial" for the purposes of 
custom.23 
Then in Oregon the state supreme court found custom as 
the basis for allowing all the citizens of the state to go upon 
all dry sand areas along the Pacific coast of Oregon, private 
or not, resulting in the inability of private landowners in 
these areas to build anything that would obstruct such access 
though this proposition was neither briefed nor argued by 
the parties.24 According to the court: 
Because so much of our law is the product ofiegislation, 
we sometimes lose sight of the importance of custom as a 
source of law in our society. It seems particularly appro-
priate in the case at the bar to look to an ancient and ac-
cepted custom in this state as the source of a rule oflaw. 
The rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in 
confinuing a public right, and at the same time it takes 
from no man anything which he has had a legitimate rea-
son to regard as exclusively his.25 
The court cited Blackstone as a basis for its decision, 
claiming that its decision "meets everyone of Blackstone's 
requisites." 26 The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the rights 
of native Hawaiians to exercise "traditional and customary" 
rights on any land in the state, whether private or public, 
again on customary law grounds, citing Blackstone.27 
It may very well be possible to interpret the common law 
of the several states so as to create such property rights with-
out reference to custom (though it is doubtful such creation 
could withstand federal judicial scrutiny under the Fifth 
Amendment's takings clause) but the fact remains that the 
courts did not. Custom-Blackstonian custom-becomes 
the ultimate bedrock, the last defense, of each decision. One 
suspects the courts understood they are on thin ice indeed in 
breaching the fundamental right of the pri vate landowner to 
exclude others.28 Only if the right is somehow preexist-
ing-a background principle of state property law, for ex-
ample--can the courts avoid a taking, on the obvious 
ground that one takes title to private property as one finds it, 
customs, background principles, and all. A court decision or 
legislative declaration of such rights takes nothing from a 
landowner if, based on such preexisting limitations or back-
ground principles, the landowner had no such rights in his or 
22. State ex reI. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979). 
23. [d. at 1\01-02. 
24. Oregon ex reI. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). See also 
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d449, 24 ELR 20913 (Or. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, in his stinging dissent, Justice Scalia declared it was an "un-
derstatement that this case raise[d] a serious Fifth Amendment 
takings issue." [d. at 1335. See generally Public Access to Beaches, 
22 STAN. L. REV. 564(1970); LewE. Delo, The English Doctrine oJ 
Custom in Oregon Property Law, 4 ENVTL. L. 383 (1974). 
25. Oregon ex rei. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 671. 
26. [d. at 677. 
27. PASH v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 
1994). 
28. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, \0 ELR 20042 
(1979); NolJan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825, 17 ELR 
20918 (1987); Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374,24 ELR 2\083 
(1994); and commentary, inter alia, in David L. Callies, Regulatory 
Taking and the Supreme Coun, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523 (1999). 
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her bundle of rights (the famous Holfeldian bundle of sticks 
example) in the first place.29 
Clearly this emphasis on customary law-and in particu-
lar Blackstonian custom-requires an investigation of what 
Blackstone meant in his commentaries by the term "cus-
tom." Of particular importance are the seven criteria which 
make such a custom "good," for if courts are going to decide 
property rights cases on the basis of such custom, then they 
must either adopt it as they find it (that's the point of prece-
dent, surely) or, if different, tell us why certain of the criteria 
are inapplicable. The elimination of a fundamental pri-
vate-property right-the right to exclude-demands no 
less. What Blackstone, and the contemporary English 
courts, meant under each of these criteria is the major thrust 
of the following section. 
Blackstonian Custom: What It Is and Why We Should Care 
Customary law is in derogation of that greatest of English 
gifts to the regulation of human behavior, the common law. 
Extolled on at least three continents as the epitome of fair-
ness and consistency, common law permits the changing of 
law to reflect common social beliefs and attitudes by accre-
tion rather than by avulsion. Although there is the occa-
sional overruling of precedent, the norm is gradual change 
through multiple judicial decisions. 
It is the common law that formed the basis of legal juris-
prudence in the American colonies in the 17th century, and 
in the new United States in the 18th century. In the latter, 
reception statutes passed in the various states resulted in 
the formal adoption of English common law as the basis for 
legal proceedings. The repository ofthat common-law tra-
dition was William Blackstone's Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. 30 Although there are at least 16 editions 
of the Commentaries, it is generally recognized that the 
first edition of 1765-1769 was the most influential in the 
United States. 
Blackstone wrote his commentaries at least in part as a 
polemic in favor of the common law, and to buttress it 
against anything that might serve to weaken it. It is against 
this context that his commentaries on custom must be read. 
Indeed, Blackstone recognized three forms of customary 
law: common law ("general custom") by which he presum-
ably meant common law as we view it today, court (proce-
dural) custom of particular tribunals or courts, and "particu-
lar customs" practiced by and affecting the inhabitants of a 
defined geographical area. It is this third, or "particular," 
custom which Blackstone took care to carefully define and 
delimit, arguably because he viewed it as a threat to the com-
mon-law tradition which he espoused and for which he ar-
gues in the Commentaries. He set out seven criteria which a 
customary right or practice must meet if it is to be a "good" 
custom, that is, one which is enforceable against a com-
mon-law principle or tradition, say, of exclusive possession 
of private land, a situation in which many of the disputes 
over custom arose, as we shall see. But Blackstone did not 
draw these seven principles from the air. Although he cited 
comparatively few cases, he was declaring the law pretty 
much as it had developed by the middle of the 18th century , 
29. See majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003,22 ELR 21104 (1992). 
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *57 (Bernard C. Gavit 
ed., 1941). 
and indeed, as it continued well into the 19th century. To be 
valid, to be enforceable, to result in a right of an individual 
despite common-law principles to the contrary, a custom 
had to be immemorial, continuous, peaceable, reasonable, 
certain, compulsory, and consistent. Even today, the law of 
custom is hedged around by requirements, most of which 
derive directly from Blackstone's seven criteria. Thus, for 
example, a recent volume of Halsbury's Laws of EnglancP1 
describes the essential attributes of custom as follows: 
To be valid, a custom must have four essential attrib-
utes: (1) it must be immemorial; (2) it must be reason-
able; (3) it must be certain in its terms and in respect both 
of the locality where it is alleged to obtain and ofthe per-
sons whom it is alleged to effect; (4) it must have contin-
ued as of right and without interruption since its imme-
morial origin. These characteristics serve a practical pur-
pose as rules of evidence when the existence of a custom 
is to be established or refuted.32 
Even so practical a source as a standard reference book of 
law for local government councilors has the following entry: 
Cu.stmn 
If a right is gi ven to or an obligation imposed upon all 
the Queen's subjects, it must be established by author-
ity of the general law. A local custom can therefore 
never be general and a customary claim in the name of 
the general public will fail. Similarly a custom must be 
capable of definition, and so the courts will not uphold a 
claim on behalf of a class whose membership cannot be 
ascertained.33 
It is the seven rules or criteria applicable to particular (not 
common law, not special court rules, but land rights in dero-
gation of common law particular to a particular and limited 
jurisdiction and exercised by a small and definite popula-
tion) custom which courts have dealt with and which form 
the basis still for English discussion and categorization of 
customary law. 34 The following discussion takes them in the 
order in which Blackstone presents them in his commentar-
ies, though clearly for purposes of American adoption and 
usage, some of the criteria-such as immemoriality as 
Blackstone would define it-must be modified to fit a coun-
try whose common-law experience makes the application of 
certain criteria somewhat difficult. 
Immemoriality 
That it have been used so long, that the memory of man 
runneth not to the contrary. So that if anyone can shew 
the beginning of it, it is no good custom. For which rea-
son no custom can prevail against an express act of par-
liament, since the statute itself is a proof of a time when 
such a custom did not exist.35 
The use of a custom "so long that the memory of man 
runneth not to the contrary" is a criterion honored as much in 
the breach in current English cases as in its ancient purity. 
31. 12 (I) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998). 
32. Para. 606, at 160. This entire section on custom is a superb explana-
tion of custom today, prepared by one of the preeminent scholars in 
legal history, Professor I.H. Baker, Fellow of St. Catherine's Col-
lege, Cambridge. 
33. CHARLES ARNOLD-BAKER, LOCAL COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION 
(4th ed., Butterworth's, London 1994), at 35. 
34. 12 (I) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998). 
35. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76-77. 
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However, for centuries, "time out of memory" had a fixed, 
well-defined, and accepted meaning. The phrase is a com-
mon one in setting up a custom as a defense against what 
would otherwise be an unlawful act. 
The notion of immemoriality was not only taken seriously 
by the courts in Blackstone's tim~, but the ~fmition of 
immemoriality was clear and uneqUIvocal. Nothing de~on­
strates this rigid attachment better than the 1769 case of Millar 
v. Taylor,36 an old copyright case which turned on the 
immemoriality of an alleged custom of a company to have sole 
rights to publish a book once r~gistt:red with it. Th~ custom ~as 
held bad because "[v ]ery certainly, It could not be tmmemonal: 
for, the art of printing was not known in ~s !dngdom till the 
reign of Ed.4." 37A note following the case mdicates that, so far 
as the court knew, "[t]he first work that is known to have a date 
to it, was the Psalter published in Mentz, in 1457 ."38 ~~ is this 
dispositive? Because by the accepted legal defirutlon of 
immemoriality a custom had to be traceable back to the coro-
nation of Richard I in 1189! In short, immemoriality must be 
provable as an empirical fact, not simply as an assertion. . 
However, courts were not unreasonable, even 10 
Blackstone's time, in precisely defining the custom. In the 
1795 case of Fitch v. Rawling, 39 the court had no difficulty in 
finding that parishioners coul~ play cricket und~r a custom 
for "all the inhabitants of a pansh to play at all kinds of law-
ful games, sports and pastimes in the close40 of A. at all sea-
sonable times of the year at their free will and pleasure."41 
Clearly there was no cricket in 1189. One of the judges si!ll-
ply observed that "[t]he lord might have granted such ~ pnv-
ilege, as is claimed by the first custom, before th~ tl~e of 
memory. "42 Such was the law with respect to the cntenon of 
immemoriality in Blackstone's time, and therefore at the 
time of English common-law adoption in the United States 
at the end of the 18th century. 
However it is also clear that as the coronation of Richard 
I faded eve; deeper in the history of England, it was harder 
and harder to show that a custom dated from 1189-or any-
thing like. Therefore by the mid-19th century,. this criterion 
of immemoriality was reduced to a presumptIOn that, once 
established, shifted the burden to the one attacking the cus-
tom to show by evidence that it was not immemorial. This 
shift is clearly apparent in a number of 19th century cases. 
However, even then, some notes in ancient practice or exer-
cise of the customs right claim, was required. 
Perhaps nowhere is this more clear than in the 18~7 case 
of Bastard v. Smith,43 an action for trespass for breaking and 
entering certain closes and trenching through a lawn in order 
to divert water to a tin mine. To the claim that the custom 
could not be proved to be immemorial, the redoubtable 
Chief Justice Tindal observed in summing up to a jury: 
Then, as to the proof of the custom, you cannot, indeed, 
reasonably expect to have it proved before you, that such 
36. 4 Burr 2303, 98 E.R. 201 (1769). 
37. Id. at 2368. 
38. Id. at 2417. 
39. 2 Hy BI 393 (1795); All E.R. 571 (1775-1802); 126 E.R. 614. 
40. A portion of land, as a field, enclosed by a hedge, fence or other visi-
ble enclosure. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DlcnONARY 321 
(1981). 
41. 2 Hy Bl at 393; All E.R. at 571; 126 E.R. at 614. 
42. Id. at 399; All E.R. at 574; 126 E.R. at 617. 
43. 2 M & Rob 129 (1837); All E.R. 201 (1835-1842). 
a custom did in fact exist before time of legal memory, 
that is, before the first year of the reign of Richard I; for if 
you did, it would in effect destroy the validity of almost 
all customs: but you are to require proof, as far back as 
living memory goes, of a continuous, peaceable, and un-
interrupted user of the custom: and then you should in-
quire whether any document, o.r memo:ial, of more a~­
cient times, is produced, tendmg to d,sprove the eXIs-
tence of the custom at that early period to which the law 
looks back.44 
Continuity 
It must have been continued. Any interruption would 
cause a temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new be-
ginning, which will be within time of memory, and 
thereupon the custom will be void. But this must be un-
derstood with regard to an interruption of the right; for 
an interruption of the possession only, for ten or twenty 
years, will not destroy the custom. As in have a ri~ht of 
way by custom over another's field, ~he custom IS n~t 
destroyed, though I do not pass over It fo~ ten y~ars; It 
only becomes more difficult to prove: but If t~e "g~t be 
any how discontinued for a day, the custom IS qUite at 
an end.45 
This is perhaps one of the more difficult of ~lackstone' s 
criteria to establish from the cases, partIcularly of 
Blackstone's time, because it does not appear to have arisen 
apart from immemoriality. Though Blackstone cites ~o cases 
in his Commentaries for this criterion, it was established at 
least a century and a half before he wrote them that continu-
ity was a requirement in the 1608. Ta~istry Ca!e.46 Neverthe-
less it does appear that the contmUlty to WhICh Blackstone 
refe~s, much like the law of easements, is one of right and 
not of usage. Certainly this is so by the 20th century. 
Compelling is the 1865 case of Gaved v. M~rtyn.,47 one of 
several fascinating tin-mining cases. Here, tm rruners had 
artificially brought water to the surface of certain lands for 
the purpose of streaming their tin. Plaintiff claimed th~ same 
water by prescription. The court held that whereas It was 
possible to obtain such a right by prescription, the~e w~ not 
a sufficient claim "of right" as the rights of the tm-rruners 
were by custom of the county of Cornwall "and the miners 
had not permanently abandoned the~r ~ght. of con1!01 over 
the water in the stream when the plamtlff dIverted It by the 
upper to launder his works."48 .. 
This matter of purposeful abandonment IS partIcularly 
significant. Indeed, one of the more fascinating of the cases 
dealing with customary rights turns to a large extent on 
abandonment of a customary right-or the lack thereof. In 
the 1870 case of Warrick v. Queens College, Oxjord,49 free-
hold tenants of certain manors held by Queens College sued 
to restrain the college from enclosing certain nearby open 
space, leasing it to the government for ~llery prac~ce, ~d 
the building of buildings thereon. The basIS of the SUIt for m-
junctive relief was the collection of common ~ghts the 
plaintiffs claimed in the open space of that portIon of the 
44. Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
45. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *77. 
46. Davis 28. 80 E.R. 639 (1608). 
47. 19 CB (NS) 732 (1865). 
48. Id. at 757. 
49. 10 L.R. Eq. 105 (1870). 
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manors (the three common areas being Shoulder of Mutton 
Green, Plumbstead Common, and Bostal Heath) particu-
larly to pasture cattle levant et couchant,50 feed geese and 
ducks, cut wood, hay and turf, and walk, drive, and ride 
upon the commons for exercise and recreation. While the 
court found substantial evidence that several commoners 
had by persuasion, threat, and other means ceased ex~rcis­
ing their common rights and moreover that all the nghts 
were not exercisable on all three of the commons, the court 
held that where the lord had attempted to stop the user of a 
common, the fact that some of the tenants had yielded to 
such attempts was not an interruption of the right within the 
meaning of certain statutes defining interruption. As a con-
sequence, what customary rights remained, were ~uf~­
ciently continuous to be upheld. Therefore the plamtIff 
commoners were entitled to their injunction. In closing, the 
court observed: 
I regret much that the good understanding which seems 
to have prevailed between the college and the freehold 
tenants of the manor for centuries up to 1859 should 
ever have been disturbed, but the increased valued for 
building purposes of the soil in these suburban com-
mons has of late years created much litigation, stirring 
up antiquated questions of black-letter law-unfortu-
nately at a great expense to the parties concerned, and 
with little profit to anyone who is not a member of the 
legal profession.51 
The relatively modem 1962 case of Wyld v. Silver2 illus-
trates most conclusively the Blackstonian doctrine on this 
point: interruption of use does not equate with interruption 
of the right, which would end the custom. Based on cus-
tom, plaintiffs claimed a declaration that as inhabitants of a 
parish, they were entitled to hold an annual fair on a plot of 
land acquired by defendant, and that the defendant was not 
entitled to disturb the soil or erect any building on it, and 
ordering defendant to remove what buildings and struc-
tures he had erected. Holding that the plaintiffs had shown 
their rights still existed, the court granted the injunction 
against the defendants. To the claim that the rights had 
long-since been abandoned, Master of the Rolls Lord Den-
ning held: 
True it is that no fair or wake has been held there within 
living memory. But no matter. They have a right, they 
say, to hold it on this piece of land .... Needless to say, 
after so long a period of disuse, the inhabitants must es-
tablish their right with clearness and certainty, but I must 
say they have done it. ... [Their proof] clearly show[s] 
the right of the inhabitants, and there is no reason to sup-
pose they have lost it. I know of no way in which the in-
habitants of a parish can lose a right of this kind once 
they have acquired it except by Act of Parliament. Mere 
disuse will not do. And I do not see how they can waive it 
or abandon it. No one or more of the inhabitants can 
waive or abandon it on behalf of the others. Nor can all 
the present inhabitants waive or abandon it on behalf of 
future generations .... In my judgment, therefore, the in-
habitants of Wraysbury still have the right to hold a fair 
50. Literally, rising and falling down; the tenn was applied to trespas~­
ing cattle which have remained long enough upon land to have lam 
down to rest and risen up to be fed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 906 
(6th ed. 1990). 
51. 10 L.R. Eq. at 129-30. 
52. I Ch. 243 (1963). 
or wake on this piece of land on the Friday in Whitsun 
week.53 
Indeed, as the court above suggests, the issue of proof is of-
ten the most difficult in establishing continuity, as it once 
was in establishing immemorial usage. However, once the 
obstacle is overcome, courts have on occasion been quite 
generous in finding customary rights. Thus, in the 1840 case 
of Scales v. Key,54 a custom found to exist in 1689 was held 
good even though it had not been exercised for 150 years. 
On the other had, the court in Hammerton v. HoneyS found a 
strong presumption against custom when an alleged custom 
is unexercised for many years, and that lack of use is acqui-
esced in by those alleged to be entitled to that exercise. 
Peacefulness 
It must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not sub-
ject to contention and dispute. For as customs owe their 
original to common consent, their being immemorially 
disputed either at law or otherwise is a proof that such 
consent was wanting.56 
The criterion of peacefulness, like continuity, comes up less 
often than the other criteria in reported cases, and 
Blackstone cites none whatsoever in his discussion (though 
he does cite to Coke on Littleton as with virtually all of the 
criteria}.57 Indeed, the issue of peacefulness appears most 
often to arise in the negative. Thus, in the 1913 case of 
Payne v. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners and Landon,58 
tenants of a manor asserted a customary right to fish in a par-
ticular area or messuage.59 After noting that the tenants had 
to establish, inter alia, that they had enjoyed the custom 
from time immemorial and that the usage was reasonable, 
the court referred to "the continual protest by the lord or the 
farmer when the tenants asserted the custom."60 The court 
held ("not without regret") that the custom failed for want of 
immemoriality as well, apparently, as peacefulness. 
On the other hand, the court, in the 1863 case of Wake v. 
Hall,61 upheld mining customs (even though expanded to re-
flect modem machinery usage) in part because the "alleged 
ancient right, springs from unquestioned immemorial cus-
toms ... [and] does not appear to have ever, before the pres-
ent occasion, been the subject of controversy or litigation."62 
53. Id. at 255-56. 
54. 11 Ad. & El. 819 (1840); 113 E.R. 625. 
55. 24 W.R. 603 (1876). 
56. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *77. 
57. There is some variation in subsequent editions of the Commentaries 
in the footnotes to various parts of the discussion on custom, paT!i~u­
larly with respect to the criteria. Thus, fo~ ~xampl~, the first e~ltlOn 
appears to be no footnote j in the first editIOn, which appears 10 the 
text and notes to several of the subsequent editions (at least in sec-
ond, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eight) in the section on conti.nuity. 
This and other minor variations in punctuation and capitalizalion do 
not appear to affect the substance of the text and ref~rences in ~y 
significant way. See original editions in the manuscnpts colleclion 
of the Cambridge University Library, reviewed by the author March 
1999. 
58. 30 T.L.R. 167 (1913). 
59. Defined as a dwelling house with adjacent buildings and ground. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (6th ed. 1990). 
60. 30 T.L.R. at 168. 
61. 8 L.R. A.C. 195 (1883). 
62. Id. at 215. 
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Again, in Warrick63 (mentioned in the previous section) the 
court, in noting the recent attempts to keep tenants from as-
serting their commoner rights, said, "[b lut these are not suf-
ficient to invalidate what appear to be the continued and un-
contested rights of the freehold tenants ... which, as I have 
said, I never find to have been contested until the year 
1860."64 
Reasonableness 
Customs must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, 
they must not be unreasonable. Which is always, as Sir 
Edward Coke says, to be understood of every unlearned 
man's reason, but of artificial and legal reason, war-
ranted by authority of a law. Upon which account a cus-
tom may be good, though the particular reason of it can-
not be assigned; for it sufficeth, if no good legal reason 
can be assigned against it. Thus, a custom in a parish, that 
no man shall put his beasts into the common till the third 
of october, would be good; and yet it would be hard to 
shew the reason why that day in particular is fixed upon, 
rather than the day before or after. But a custom that no 
cattle shall be put in till the lord of the manor has first put 
in his, is unreasonable, and therefore bad: for peradven-
ture the lord will never put in his; and then the tenants 
will lose all their profits.65 
The critical importance of reasonableness is best set out in 
Arthur v. Bokenham,66 a dispute over an alleged custom per-
mitting the devise of certain property acquired after the 
making of a will. With respect to reasonableness, the court 
set out the basis for sharply restricting custom, even more 
than acts of Parliament, because of its detrimental effect on 
common law: 
[A]ll customs, which are against the common law of 
England, ought to be taken strictly, nay very strictly, 
even stricter than any Act of Parliament that alters the 
common law. It is a general rule, that customs are not to 
be enlarged beyond the usage; because it is the usage and 
practice that makes the law in such cases, and not the rea-
son of the thing, for it cannot be said that a custom is 
founded on reason, though an unreasonable custom is 
void; for no reason, even the highest whatsoever, would 
make a custom or law; so it is no particular reason that 
makes any custom law, but the usage and practice itself, 
without regard had to any reason of such usage; and 
therefore you cannot enlarge such custom by any parity 
of reason, since reason has no part in the making of such 
custom. Now in the construction of Acts of Parliament it 
is otherwise, and there is a greater latitude allowed in 
them; and the reason that induced the law-makers to 
make such Acts to take away the common law, may be 
and is usually urged in making construction of them. 
There in doubtful cases we may enlarge the construction 
of Acts of Parliament according to the reason and sense 
of the law-makers expressed in other parts of the Act, or 
guessed. by considering the frame and design of the 
whole. But it is not so in the case of a custom, because not 
founded on any particular reason.67 
Certainly, as both Coke and Blackstone suggest. reason-
ableness cannot depend solely on whether it appears reason-
63. 10 L.R. Eq. 105 (1870). 
64. [d. at 127 (emphasis added). 
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *77. 
66. 11 Mod 148,6 Queen Anne. 
67. [d. at 160-62 (emphasis added). 
able to the freeholder or owner whose land is burdened with 
the exercise of a customary right, say, of common or pas-
sage, to have such a burden on his land. Although there are 
cases which clearly hold too much interference with that 
land will make the alleged custom void for unreasonable-
ness. Certainly. also, reasonableness means reasonable as a 
matter of law. But there are many variants in between. 
The issue of reasonableness is not only one of the most 
common issues raised in cases dealing with custom,68 but it 
is one of the earliest. Well before Blackstone wrote his com-
mentaries. English courts were struggling with the concept 
and declaring customs bad as unreasonable. The earliest of 
these appears to be the 1401 yearbook case of Miles v. 
Benet,69 which is almost certainly the source of 
Blackstone's example in his Commentaries. The alleged 
custom, that tenants should not put beasts into the common 
before the lord of the manor, was held void because the lord 
might not put in his beasts at all and thereby bar the com-
moners' rights for all time. This helped establish the princi-
ple that a custom that subjects a multitude to the whim of an 
individual is bad as unreasonable.70 
Coke had quite a lot to say about reasonableness as a cri-
terion for good custom, for which Blackstone cited him. 
Coke established that reasonableness of custom is a ques-
tion of law, for the court. and not a question of fact, for a 
jury, in the 1612 case of Rowles v. Mason.71 There, the cus-
tom alleged was that a copyhold tenant may cut down all the 
trees on his land and sell them. After distinguishing custom 
from prescriptive rights. Coke declared the custom "against 
common reason. incongruent and against common law, that 
a copy-holder for life may cut and sell the trees and custom 
ought to have reason and congruence.'>72 There follow sev-
eral examples of customs which would be bad because con-
trary to the law of estates as. for example, turbary73 attached 
to land rather than to a house. 
In the 1698 case of Weekly v. Wildman.74 the custom of all 
inhabitants of a town to have common for all commonable 
cattle was held unreasonable and so bad, because there was 
no limit to the number of cattle that could be turned loose on 
the land in question and the plaintiff had not given any rea-
son why such a surcharge of the common would be good. 
The case came up in an interesting fashion. Defendant "had 
erected an engine by which he cast the water upon the said 
fen, more than could be carried off by the drains of the said 
fen. whereby the said fen was drowned. so that the plaintiff 
could not enjoy his common in so full and beneficial a man-
ner as he ought."75 
Although the older cases discussed above often dealt with 
such as tolls, inheritance. and criminal procedures, under 
this criterion the courts come to grips most often with the ad-
verse effect on private property which the exercise of cus-
tomary rights will likely have. This is particularly true of the 
68. Occurring in nearly two-thirds of the roughly 200 cases of record re-
viewed by the author. 
69. Y.B. Trin. 2 Hen .• 4 f.24, pl.20 (1401). 
70. See 12 (1) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998). 
71. 2 Brown 192. 123 E.R. 829, 892 (1611). 
72. [d. at 199-200, 123 E.R. at 895. 
73. The right or liberty of digging up turf on another's ground. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1516 (6th ed. 1990). 
74. 1 Ld. Raym 405. 91 E.R. 1169 (1698). 
75. [d. 
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cases that arose during Blackstone's time (the middle of the 
18th century), which presumably he had in mind when writ-
ing the Commentaries, and shortly thereafter, often reflect-
ing his conclusions in the Commentaries. Although turning 
as much on the issue of certainty (discussed in the next sec-
tion), the 1742 mining case of Broadbent v. Wilkes76 is an 
excellent example of a Blackstone-era case in which the 
court could not stomach the unreasonableness of the cus-
tom. The custom alleged: 
[W]here the customary tenant of a manor has coal 
mines lying under the freehold lands of other customary 
tenants, within and parcel of the manor, he may sink pits 
in those lands to get the coals &c., may lay the coals 
when got and the earth and rubbish &c. on the land near 
to such pits, such lands being customary tenements and 
parcel of the manor, there to remain and continue (not 
saying how long, or for a convenient time), may lay and 
continue wood there for the necessary use of the pits, 
may take away carts and wagons part (not saying how 
much) of the coals, and bum and make into cinders the 
other parts there at his will and pleasure.77 
The court declared this to be an unreasonable and void 
custom: 
And certainly no custom can be more unreasonable than 
the present. It may deprive the tenant of the whole profits 
of the land; for the lord or his tenants may dig coal-pits 
when and as often as they please, and may in such case 
lay their coals &c. on any partofthe tenant's land, if near 
to such coal-pits, at what time of the year they please, and 
may let them like there as long as they please ... So that 
they may be laid on the tenant's land and continue there 
forever ... which is absurd and unreasonable. The objec-
tion that this custom is only beneficial to the lord and 
greatly prejudicial to the tenants is, we think, of no 
weight, for it might have a reasonable commencement 
notwithstanding, for the lord might take less for the land 
on the account of this disadvantage to his tenant. But the 
true objections to this custom are, that it is uncertain and 
likewise unreasonable, as it may deprive the tenant of the 
whole benefit of the land, and it cannot be presumed that 
the tenant at first would come into such an agreement. 78 
The decisions were sustained in 1745 in Wilkes v. 
Broadbent,19 with particular emphasis on the great bur-
den on private land without any noticeable public or pri-
vate consideration. 
The burdening of private lands with custom continued to 
be a fertile ground for litigation shortly after the last editions 
of Blackstone were published. In the 1818 case of R v. In-
habitants of Ecclesfield, 80 the alleged custom was for parish-
ioners to repair a road in another parish. Citing both 
Blackstone and Coke, Lord Ellenborough held the custom 
to be unreasonable in part because "[t]here cannot be a cus-
tom in one place to do something in another. The land in a 
particular place, and the inhabitants in respect thereof, may 
be charged by custom, for matters within the place; but cus-
tom will not apply to matters out of it."81 
76. Willes 360, 125 E.R. 1214 (1742). 
77. [d. 
7S. [d. at 363, 125 E.R. at 1216. 
79. 2 Stra 1224; I Wi Is 63; 93 E.R. 1146 (1745). 
SO. 1 B & Aid 34S, 106 E.R. 12S (ISIS). 
SI. [d. at 360, 106 E.R. at 133 (citing Gateward' s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 596, 
77 E.R. 344 (1607». 
The rest of the cases dealing with reasonableness-and 
they number in the dozens-defy easy categorization. One 
of the most common reasons for declaring a custom unrea-
sonable-and these outnumber the reasonable cases by a 
fair margin-is that the custom has an unusually burden-
some effect on the land over or on which it is exercised. Sev-
eral such cases are discussed above, such as Broadbent in 
Blackstone's day. This is not an isolated case, nor an iso-
lated concern. In the 1837 case of Bastard,82 discussed ear-
lier under irnrnemoriality, Justice Tindal instructed the jury 
as follows with respect to the Devonshire custom for tin 
miners to direct water into their mines: 
[T]ouching the unreasonableness of the custom, though 
you are not called on to say whether this be a reasonable 
custom or not (for that is a matter of law, not submitted 
by the present pleadings to your decision), still you may 
properly thus far look to the nature of the custom that, if 
you find it greatly affecting the rights of private property, 
you may fairly expect and require that it should be sup-
ported by evidence proportionably strong and convinc-
ing. You are not to come to the conclusion that inhabit-
ants of a large district, like that over which the supposed 
custom extends, surrendered their rights over their own 
soil, unless you find repeated acts of exercise of the cus-
tom on the one hand, and of acquiescence on the other.83 
The early 20th century cases of Mercer v. Denne,84 up-
holding custom of the inhabitants of a parish (fishermen) to 
use a piece of land covered with shingle to spread and dry 
their nets as in favor of navigation, permitted the exercise of 
the custom to change with the times so long as the burden on 
the landowner was not unreasonable: 
The tanning, cutching or oiling of nets [new] belonging 
to fishermen tend to preserve the nets and make them 
useful for a longer period, and the subsequent drying of 
nets seems to me to fall within the reasons thus assigned 
for the custom. It is laid down by Holt, J. in City of Lon-
don v. Vanacacre85 [a late 17th century case] that "gen-
eral customs may be extended to new things which are 
within the reason of those customs." There is not, in my 
opinion, evidence from which it ought to be inferred that 
the practice of tanning or cutching has arisen within the 
time oflegal memory. But it was said that, so far as re-
lated to the drying after oiling, the use has extended over 
a period of from twenty-five to thirty-five years only, 
and, moreover, that this user was more burdensome than 
the old user for drying after tanning or cutching. I think, 
however, that the law as laid down by Lord St. Leonards 
in Dyce v. Hay cited by Farwell J., applies, and that those 
who are entitled to the benefit of a custom ought not to be 
deprived of that benefit simply because they take advan-
tage of modem inventions or new operations so long as 
they do not thereby throw an unreasonable burden on 
the landowner.86 
Again, "[i]t must not be forgotten that the persons claim-
ing under the custom are bound to exercise their rights rea-
sonably and with due regard to the interest of the owner of 
the soil.,,87 According to Judge Falwell in the court below 
82. 2 M & Rob 126 (1837); [1835-42] All E.R. 201. 
83. [d. at 203 (emphasis added). 
84. 2 Ch. 534 (1904); 2 Ch. 538 (C.A.) (1905). 
85. 12 Mod 270, 271 (1699). 
86. 2 Ch. 538, 581 (1905) (emphasis added). 
87. [d. at 584 (1905). 
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(1904), reasonableness is detennined at the inception of a 
custom and it is no objection that it may at times have been 
used in an unreasonable manner.88 His opinion represents an 
early 20th century view of the limitations and requirements 
of custom.89 
Perhaps there is no better example of language requiring 
the protection of underlying property rights than the 1847 
case of Rogers v. Brenton.9Q Cornish tin miners claimed by 
custom to be able to renew their claims by renewing bound-
ary posts, without actually working the tin mine. Although 
the court appeared to hold the renewal unreasonable with-
out actual working of the mine, Lord Denman held tin 
bounding generally reasonable, only because there was a 
benefit to the public: 
Customs, especially where they derogate from the gen-
eral rights of property, must be construed strictly; and 
above all things they must be reasonable. Bounding is a 
direct interference with the common law rights of prop-
erty.1t takes from the owner ofland, who is unable or un-
willing at a particular moment to dig for tin under his 
waste land, the right to do so, it may be forever, and vests 
it in a stranger, making only a customary render in re-
turn: it empowers the stranger not only to extract the 
mineral from beneath the surface but to enter on the sur-
face and cumber it with the machinery, buildings and re-
fuse stuff which the operations below occasion; and all 
this without the least regard to the convenience or inter-
ests of the owner. The only things which make this rea-
sonable are the render of the toll tin to the owner and the 
benefit to the public secured thereby in the extraction of 
the mineral from the bowels of the earth. Both of these 
are not only lost, but the latter, it may be, positively pre-
vented, if the bounder may decline to work, and yet re-
tain the right to exclude the owner.91 
"Contrary to natural justice" was the rationale of the court 
in striking down as unreasonable several customs. For ex-
ample, the court found certain court processes to be contrary 
to the principles of natural justice, in the 1867 case of Lon-
don Corpn. v. COX.92 Citing and quoting copiously from 
older opinions, the court noted repeatedly the unreasonable-
ness of the custom. 
A twist on unreasonableness comes in the unreasonable 
exercise of a lawful custom in the 1797 case of Fitch v. 
Fitch.93 There, the custom was for all the inhabitants of the 
parish of Steeple Bumstead to play at all times of the year 
lawful games and pastimes on a certain close. While the 
court upheld the custom in a suit for trespass by some of the 
inhabitants, the court made an excellent statement about the 
reciprocal rights of the parties. 
The custom appears to be established. The inhabitants 
had a right to take their amusement in a lawful way. It is 
supposed, that because they have such a right, the plain-
tiff should not allow the grass to grow. There is no foun-
dation in law for such a position. The rights of both par-
ties are distinct, and may exist together. If the inhabitants 
come in an unlawful way, or not fairly to exercise the 
88. [d. at 557 (1904). 
89. [d. at 551 (1904). 
90. 10 Q.B. 25 (1847). 
91. [d. at 58 (emphasis added) (goes on for another 20-30 lines in this 
vein). 
92. L.R. 2 H.L. 239 (1867). 
93. 2 Esp 543 (1797). 
right they claim of amusing themselves, or to use it in an 
improper way, they are not justified under the custom 
pleaded, which is a right to come to the close to use it in 
the exercise of any lawful games or pastimes, and are 
thereby trespassers. His Lordship therefore left it to the 
jury to say, whether the defendant had entered the close 
in the fair exercise of a right, or in an improper way.94 
As the inhabitants had trampled on fresh-mown hay, threw 
it about and mixed gravel with it, the court found they had 
acted in an unlawful way-an unreasonable exercise of a 
lawful custom. 
The court came to a different conclusion in the 1867 case 
of So we rby v. Coleman.95 The alleged custom was for inhab-
itants of a parish to exercise and train horses at all season-
able times of the year, in a place beyond the limits of the par-
ish. Aside from the problem of extra-parish customs dis-
cussed in the following section, it was argued: 
Secondly, this custom is unreasonable. It amounts to a 
claim of a profit a prendre, or is at least within the reason 
on which such a custom is disallowed, for it excludes the 
owner of the soil from any beneficial use of it, and that 
without compensation.96 
The court agreed: 
Here all the inhabitants of the parish claim the right 
to go into the land of another person, and to use it for the 
purpose of exercising and training horses, at all "sea-
sonable times" of the year .... Such a right, then, to ex-
ercise an indefinite number of horses, for an indefinite 
period of the year, would exclude the owner from the 
beneficial occu~ation of his property during probably 
the whole year. 7 
As the next section indicates, there is of course a measure 
of uncertainty which leads to unreasonableness, and the two 
are often related. This theme is the basis of the holding of 
unreasonableness in the modem 1964 case of Fowley Ma-
rine Ltd. v. Gafford.98 There, a supposed custom for the 
world at large to moor boats was held to be too broad as well 
as unproven. To this issue of breadth and certainty (or lack 
thereof) we now tum. 
Certainty 
Customs ought to be certain. A custom, that lands shall 
descend to the most worthy of the owner's blood, is void; 
for how shall this worth be determined? But a custom to 
descend to the next male of the blood, exclusive of fe-
males, is certain, and therefore good. A custom, to pay 
two pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to pay 
sometimes two pence and sometimes three pence, as 
the occupier of the land pleases, is bad for its uncer-
tainty. Yet a custom, to pay a years improved value for a 
fine on a copyhold estate, is good: though the value is a 
thing uncertain. For the value may at any time be ascer-
tained; and the maxim of the law is, id certum est. quod 
certum reddi potest.99 
94. [d. at 544-45. 
95. L.R. 2 Ex. 96 (1867). 
96. [d. at 97 (citing Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 596, 77 E.R. 344 
(1607)). 
97. [d. at 99-100. 
98. 2 Q.B. 808 (1967), 2 All E.R. 472 (1967). 
99. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78. 
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The matter of certainty is one of the most easily ascer-
tainable of the seven criteria in Blackstone's Commen-
taries. As appears below, it is also the one about which 
courts before, during and after Blackstone's time have 
been the clearest. It is also the criterion most obviously ig-
nored by American courts dealing with custom, even when 
citing Blackstone, as they often do. This is particularly true 
with respect to two of the most common aspects of cer-
tainty: geographic area (usually small and well-defined) 
and population (also usually small and well-defined). The 
third area in which the criterion of certainty becomes a ma-
jor factor is in the definition of the practice itself, which is 
allegedly customary in nature. 
Certainty of Practice 
Such was clearly the case in Blackstone's time. Thus, in 
the 1745 case of Wilkes,loo the custom was for the lord of 
the manor or his tenants, when mining coal, "time out of 
mind to throw the earth, stones, coals &c. coming there-
fore together in heaps upon the land near such pits ... ."101 
Not only did this totally deprive the other tenants of the 
value oftheir land, but "there being no restriction in time, 
[and] the word near was too vague and uncertain. "102 
The opinion of the lower court lO3 explains the nature of 
the uncertainty: 
If every uncertain custom be void, this cannot be good, 
for nothing can be more uncertain. The word "near" is 
not intelligible: but, to make it certain and intelligible, it 
should be "nearest" or "adjoining." Supposing many 
lands and of different persons lay within a small dis-
tance, some ten yards off, and some twenty &c; which of 
these lands must be said to be near within the meaning of 
this custom? The custom, that is laid, is to take away and 
carry away part of the coals placed there, and to bum and 
make into cinders the other parts thereof, not saying what 
part, nor how long it is to lie there. So in this respect the 
custom is likewise quite uncertain. 104 
Again, in the 1746 case of Millechamp v. Johnson,105 an 
alleged custom for the inhabitants of a parish to play games 
on plaintiffs close was held bad for uncertainty: to play 
"any" rural games. Also in the 1788 case of Steel v. Hought-
on,l06 concerning a custom for the poor and indigent in a par-
ish to glean, 107 although the principle problem was one of the 
indefiniteness of the class to which the custom applied (a 
factor of certainty addressed later in this section), the court 
also found that: 
Such a custom as will support the plea, must be univer-
sal, and everywhere the same, otherwise it is void for its 
uncertainty. If it exists only in particular counties or dis-
tricts (such as the custom of being discharged from the 
payment of tithes of wood in some hundreds in the wilds 
of Kent and Sussex, or the custom of gavelkind), it is par-
100. 2 Stra 1224,93 E.R. 1146 (1745). 
101. [d. (emphasis added). 
102. [d. at 1225. 
103. Broadbent v. Wilkes, Willes 360, 125 E.R. 1214 (1742). 
104. [d. at 362. 
105. (1746) Willes 205n(b). 
106. 1 Hy Bl 51, 126 E.R. 32 (1788). 
107. To gather grain or other produce left by reapers. WEBSTER'S NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 484 (1981). 
tial, and no part of the general customs of the realm. 
From the best inquiries I have been able to make, I find 
that this custom is not universal. In some counties it is 
exercised as a general right, in others, it prevails only in 
common fields, and not in inclosures, in others it is pre-
carious, and at the will of the occupier. In the county 
where this action was brought, it never in practice ex-
tended to barley; nor is the time ascertained. In some 
counties the poor glean whilst the com is on the ground; 
here the usage is laid to be after the crop is harvested. 108 
Again, "[t]he practice also of gleaning is itself uncertain 
and changeable. In some counties it is entirely excluded, in 
others partially admitted, and in others modified with every 
possible variety.'>109 
In the 1806 case of Lady Wilson v. Willes,l1O the alleged 
custom was that all the customary tenants of the manor hav-
ing gardens have immemorially taken away, dug and carried 
away from the waste within the manor for the purpose of 
making and repairing grass-plots in the garden such turf 
covered with grass fit for the pasture of cattle, at all times of 
the year as often and in such quantity as the occasion re-
quired. Lord Ellenborough held: 
[A] custom, however ancient, must not be indefinite and 
uncertain: and here it is not defined what sort of im-
provement the custom extends to: it is not stated to be in 
the way of agriculture or horticulture: it may mean all 
sorts of fanciful improvements: every part of the garden 
may be converted into grass-plots, and even mounds of 
earth raised and covered with turf from the common: 
there is nothing to restrain the tenants from taking the 
whole of the turbary of the custom and destroying the 
pasture altogether. A custom of this description ought to 
have some limit, but here is no limitation as laid, but ca-
price and fancy. Then this privilege is claimed to be exer-
cised when occasion requires. What description can be 
more loose than that? It is not even confined to the occa-
sions of the garden. It resolves itself, therefore, into the 
mere will and pleasure of the tenant, which is inconsis-
tent with the rights of all the other commoners as well as 
of the lord. The third special plea is also vastly too indefi-
nite: it goes to establish a right to take as much of the turf 
of the common as any tenant pleases for making banks 
and mounds on his estate: it is not even confined to pur-
poses of agriculture. All the customs laid therefore are 
bad, as being too indefinite and uncertain. I I I 
The trend of the law continued in this vein into the 19th 
and 20th centuries. In the 1835 case of Bluwett v. 
Tregonning, I 12 it was held uncertain and so bad for all the in-
habitants of a parish to enter a particular close at all reason-
able times of the year to collect and carry away reasonable 
quantities of sand drifted onto the land by the sea. Indeed, 
one justice declared: 
The custom alleged is uncertain, indefinite and absurd. 
In point of fact there can be no rule for ascertaining, in a 
case like this, what is sand blown from the sea-shore and 
what is the original soil. And, in law, I do not see how 
there could be any such custom as this. I 13 
108. 1 Hy Bl at 60. 
109. [d. at 62. 
110. 7 East 121 (1806). 
111. [d. at 128. 
112. 3 Ad. & El. 554, 111 E.R. 524 (1835). 
113. [d. at 575-76. 
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Certainty of Locale 
To be good, a custom needs to be confined to a particular 
place or locale, like a county, a parish or a village. I 14 Other-
wise, it approaches the general application and usage which 
is the hallmark of the common-law principle, to which acus-
tom is usually opposed. This was true during and after 
Blackstone's time, and well before. In the 1599 case of 
Parker v. Combleford, 115 the court declared a custom for the 
lord ofthe manor to take as heriot l16 the best beast of any per-
son dying within the manor bad in part because the custom 
was thus extended to those living outside the geographical 
area of the manor: "[i]f this be a general custom which goes 
to the whole county [presumably the court means common 
law as Blackstone would describe general custom in his 
Commentaries a century and a half later] it might be in-
tended, and peradventure would be maintainable; but not as 
a private custom within the manor [meaning presumably 
particular custom]."117 
Perhaps no stronger statement can be found than in the 
earlier mentioned case of Arthur, 118 dealing with a custom 
allegedly permitting after-acquired property to pass by de-
vise after the making of a will. The court began by declaring 
why customs are to be strictly construed: 
[B]ecause all customs which are against the common 
law of England, ought to be taken strictly, nay very 
strictly, even stricter than any Act of Parliament that al-
ters the common law. It is a general rule, that customs are 
not to be enlarged beyond the usage; because it is the us-
age and practice that makes the law in such cases, and not 
the reason ofthe thing, for it cannot be said that a custom 
is founded on reason, though an unreasonable custom is 
void; for no reason, even the highest whatsoever, would 
make a custom law; so it is no particular reason that 
makes any custom law, but the usage and practice itself, 
without regard had to any reason of such usage, and 
therefore you cannot enlarge such custom by any parity 
of reason, since reason has no part in the making of such 
custom. 119 
The court then continued: 
[T]he law allows usage ;n particular places to supersede 
the common law, and is the local law, which is never to 
be extended further than the usage and practice, which is 
the only thing that makes it law. 120 
In the 1803 case of Legh v. Hewitt,121 the defendant alleg-
edly breached a duty to occupy a farm in a good and hus-
band-like manner according to the custom of the country, by 
tilling half his farm at once, when no other farmer there tilled 
more than a third and many tilled only a fourth. The court re-
fused to find such a custom because of the lack of a particu-
lar locale: 
[I]t is evident that the word custom, as here used, cannot 
mean a custom in the strict legal signification of the 
114. See 12 (I) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998). 
115. Cro. Eliz. 725, 78 E.R. 959 (1599). 
116. A customary tribute of goods and chattels payable to the lord at 
death. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 859 (1981). 
117. Cro. Eliz. at 726. 
118. II Mod 148,6 Queen Anne. 
119. ld. at 160-61. 
120. ld. at 161. 
121. 4 East 154, 102 E.R. 789 (1803). 
word; for that must be taken with reference to some de-
fined limit or space which is essential to every custom 
properly so called. But no particular place is here as-
signed to it; nor is it capable here of being so applied. 122 
A few years later, in the 1828 case of Gifford v. Lord 
Yarborough,123 the House of Lords found land formed by 
alluvion of the sea, imperceptibly, belongs to the owner of 
the adjoining demesne lands, and not to the crown, but not 
because of a particular custom. Its rationale is instructive, 
particularly given the re!lsoning of the American court in 
Oregon in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach 124 that a custom-
ary right can extend to all the dry sand area land on the coast 
of Oregon: 
If there is custom regulating the right of the owners of all 
lands bordering on the sea, it is so general a custom as 
need not be set out in the pleadings, or proved by evi-
dence, but will be taken notice of by the Judges as part of 
the common law.125 
To the same effect was the 1913 case of Anglo-Hellenic 
Steamship Co. v. Louis Dreyfus & Co., 126 in which the ques-
tion of charterers' liability for demurrage while a ship was 
waiting to load, which turned on whether the common law 
of England or port custom prevailed. In the course of its 
opinion, the court defined custom with respect to place: 
A custom is a reasonable and universal rule of action in a 
locality, followed, not because it is believed to be the 
general law of the land or because the parties following it 
have made particular agreements to observe it, but be-
cause it "is in effect the common law within that place to 
which it extends, although contrary to the general law of 
the realm."127 
Therefore, and perhaps obviously, to avail oneself of a 
customary right, one must both live in the district in which 
the custom is alleged, and practice the customary right in 
that same district. 
The 1907 case of Lord Fitzhardinge v. Purcelll28 exem-
plifies these principles. In a typical action for trespass, the 
lord of certain manors brought the action against defendants 
who claimed customary rights to the foreshore and waters of 
a certain waterway for the purpose of hunting wiIdfow I. The 
court disallowed the defense: 
But whether or not the custom alleged be good law, I am 
of the opinion that the evidence in the present case is far 
short of what is required to prove any custom at all. The 
only evidence of any exercise of the alleged right by per-
sons being wild-fowlers by trade is the evidence of an 
exercise of the right by the defendant and his father .... It 
is not proved that any of these, with the exception of the 
defendant and his father, for some short period, lived in 
any part of the local area in which the alleged custom is 
said to prevail. It is proved that in exercising the alleged 
122. ld. at 159. The court ordered a new trial, however, because it found 
evidence of bad farming which did not depend on custom, and a 
properly instructed jury might have found against the defendant. 
123. 5 Bing 163, 130 E.R. 1028 (1828). 
124. 854 P.2d 449,24 ELR 20913 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 s. Ct. 
1332 (1994). 
125. 5 Bing at 165 (emphasis added). 
126. 108 L.T.R. 36 (1903). 
127. ld. at 37 (citing the case of Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q.B. 50 (1844)) 
(emphasis added). 
128. 2 Ch. D. 139 (1908). 
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right none of them confined himself to shooting on the 
lands in question .... [T]he user proved, therefore, is 
more extensive than the custom alleged, and would only 
be partially explained by the custom if upheld. 129 
Certainty of Persons 
The requirement that there be certainty of persons was as 
important as certainty of place in order for a custom to be 
good. This principle was well-established in the time of 
Blackstone. This is evident from the 1788 case of Selby v. 
Robinsonl30 in which there was an alleged "custom for poor 
and indigent householders living in A to cut away rotten 
boughs and branches in a chase of A."J31 Holding the defen-
dants to be therefore trespassers for breaking and entering 
plaintiff s closes, the court said: 
[T]here is no limitation at all in this case; and it is impos-
sible to ascertain who is entitled to this right under the 
custom as stated in the record; for the description of poor 
householders is too vague and uncertain.13 
Again in 1788, in Steel,133 the court struck down an al-
leged custom of gleaning on the ground that "the poor" was 
too uncertain and indefinite a class to exercise it: 
Next, the persons claiming this right, are vague and un-
defined. The tenn poor is merely relative. Before the 
statute of the 43rd of Eliz. there was no method of le-
gally ascertaining who were of that description. Since 
that statute, justices and overseers are to detennine 
what persons are of the number of the poor, to whom 
also must be added the qualifications of a settlement. ... 
They who claim this right then, are equally uncertain 
and precarious. 134 
The court was even more definite in the 1795 case of 
Fitch,135 where the custom was for all the inhabitants of a 
parish to play at all kinds of lawful games at a particular 
close at all seasonable times of the year, including all per-
sons for the time being in the same parish. As to the second 
part, the court said: 
But I hold the other custom to be as clearly bad, as the 
first is good. How that which may be claimed by all the 
inhabitants of England can be the subject of a custom, I 
cannot conceive. Customs must in their nature be con-
fined to individuals of a particular description, and what 
is common to all mankind, can never be a custom. 136 
Again, 40 years later in the 1828 case of Gifford,137 in 
holding that lands formed by accretion belonged to the 
owner of lands adjoining the sea, the court noted: 
These are called special customs because they only ap-
ply to particular descriptions of persons, and do not af-
fect all the subjects of the realm; but if they govern all 
persons belonging to the classes to which they relate, 
they are to be considered as public laws; .... If there is a 
129. [d. at 164. 
130. 2 Term Rep. 758. 
131. [d. at 758. 
132. [d. at 759. 
133. 1 H Bl 51. 
134. [d. at 62. 
135. (1795) [1775-1892] All E.R. 571. 
136. [d. at 574. 
137. 5 Bing 163, 130 E.R. 1023 (1828). 
custom regulating the right of the owners of all lands 
bordering on the sea, it is so general a custom as need not 
be set out in the pleadings, or proved by evidence, but 
will be taken notice of by the Judges as part a/the com-
mon /aw. J38 
Litigation over footpaths was a fruitful source of custom 
allegations in the 18th and 19th century. Thus, in the 1852 
case of Dyce v. Lady James Hay,J39 a magistrate of Old 
Aberdeen brought an action against Lady James Hay alleg-
ing that he and other inhabitants of New Aberdeen, Old 
Aberdeen, the vicinity thereof, 
and the public generally, had used and enjoyed from time 
immemorial a certain footpath running along the bank of 
the River Don, on the Defender's Estate [and that a par-
ticular strip] had been from time immemorial used and 
resorted to by the Purser and the other inhabitants of the 
places aforesaid "for the purpose of recreation and tak-
ing air and exercise by walking over and through the 
same, and resting thereon as they saw proper."l40 
While the court was quite willing to accept a custom for the 
use of unenclosed land for village sports and recreations,141 
it found the class too broad to sustain here: 
What is insisted upon, therefore, is of this extensive na-
ture, that the Pursuer claims as an inhabitant, but, in fact, 
on behalf of all the Queen's subjects, the right to go at all 
times upon the inclosed soil of a portion of the Appel-
lant's property near the mansion-house, for the purpose 
of recreation just as they think proper. Now, that, I con-
ceive is a claim so large as to be entirely inconsistent 
with the right of property; for no man can be considered 
to have a right of property, worth holding, in a soil over 
which the whole world has the pri vilege to walk and dis-
port itself at pleasure. 142 
Perhaps more directly on this point is the 1894 case of 
Lancashire v. Hunt,143 in which an alleged custom to train 
unlimited numbers of race horses on the manorial common 
was held bad: 
[T]he custom, so far as regarding training, was too wide, 
purporting as it did to show an exercise of an alleged 
right not limited to the inhabitants [of Stockbridge] at all, 
but quite as much for strangers and their horses as the in-
138. [d. at 164, 130 E.R. at 1023-24 (emphasis added). See also Mounsey 
v. Ismay, I H&C 729 (1863), where a custom for all the freeman of 
the city of Carlisle to enter a close for the purpose of racing horses 
was raised as a defense against an action for trespass for entering the 
close, breaking down gates and fences, and clearing mounds and 
thorns placed there by the owner. The court nevertheless held for the 
plaintiff landowner on other grounds (custom was a bad plea for an 
action brought as a claim to an easement under the Prescription Act). 
Also in Grant v. Kearney, 12 Price 773 (1823), the court refused to 
recognize a custom of perambulation of inhabitants of a particular 
liberty to pass through the gardens of Lincoln's Inn, on the ground 
that they had failed to prove the custom applied to the liberty and had 
proved only such a custom with respect to a parish, the boundaries of 
which were not shown to be coterminus with the liberty. We can per-
haps derive two lessons here: (1) the courts will often at this time 
make a great deal of the niceties of pleadings (see CHARLES DICK-
ENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853), and the notorious fictional case of 
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce) particularly where property rights are in-
volved, and (2) it does not pay to mess with the barristers of Lin-
coln's Inn. 
139. I Macqueen 305, 19 Digest (Rep\.) 15 (1852). 
140. [d. at 305, 19 Digest (Rep\.) at 300. 
141. [d. at 311, 19 Digest (Rep\.) at 302. 
142. [d. at 309, 19 Digest (Rep\.) at 301. 
143. 10 T.L.R. 448 (1894). 
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habitants, which did not prove the custom allejLed, but a 
different custom, which would be bad in law. 
Compulsory 
Customs, though established by consent, must be (when 
established) compulsory; and not left to the option of ev-
ery man, whether he will use them or not. Therefore a 
custom, that all the inhabitants shall be rated toward the 
maintenance of a bridge, will be good; but a custom, that 
every man is to contribute thereto at his own pleasure, is 
idle and absurd; and, indeed, no custom at all.145 
The concept that a custom must be compulsory in order to 
be good is for the most part self-evident; a law is not a law if 
it is not obligatory on the parties. Most of the cases on cus-
tom assume that a custom is compulsory, so that the issue is 
rarely addressed separately. 
There are nevertheless a few cases that deal with the com-
pulsory nature of a covenant as Blackstone describes it. In 
the 1690 case of Pain v. Patrick,l46 the alleged custom was 
the upkeep of a right of way involving a bridge: 
But as to the plea in bar, it is not good, because the erect-
ing of a bridge is but laying out a way; it is a voluntary 
act, and no man by reason of his own act can be dis-
charged of what he is to do, upon the interest he hath in 
the ferry.147 
Later in the 1913 case of Anglo-Hellenic Steampship 
Co. ,148 the demurrage case noted in a previous section, the 
court emphasized the binding nature of custom by compar-
ing it to local common law: 
A custom is a reasonable and universal rule of action in a 
locality, followed, not because it is believed to be the 
general law of the land or because the partiesfollowing it 
have made particular agreements to observe it, but be-
cause it "is in effect the common law within that place to 
which it extends."149 
Consistency 
Lastly, customs must be consistent with each other: one 
custom cannot be set up in opposition to another. For if 
both are really customs, then both are of equal antiquity, 
and both established by mutual consent: which to say of 
contradictory customs is absurd. Therefore, if one man 
prescribes that by custom he has a right to have windows 
looking into another's garden; the other cannot claim a 
right by custom to stop up or obstruct those windows: for 
these two contradictory customs cannot both be good, 
nor both stand together. He oUcfht rather to deny the exis-
tence of the former custom. 15 
As with compulsory, the criterion of consistency is 
largely self-evident and does not appear often in the cases on 
customary law. Of course, to agree with Blackstone that 
customs must be consistent, one with another, does not get 
us very far in deciding which customary right is entitled to 
precedence in the event of conflict. 
144. Jd. at 448. 
145. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *78 (emphasis added). 
146. 3 Mod Rep. 289, 87 E.R. 191 (1690). 
147. Jd. at 294,87 E.R. at 194. 
148. 108 L.T.R. 36 (1913). 
149. Jd. at 37 (emphasis added). 
150. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78 (emphasis added). 
One of the earlier disputes in which the issue of consis-
tency arose appears to have been decided largely on the 
ground of which custom was the more reasonable. In the 
1561 case of Parton v. Mason,l5J the court was faced with 
two conflicting customs in resolving a dispute over the sei-
zure of an ox. According to the first custom: 
But: 
[T]he lord of the manor ... was accustomed to have 
the best beast of every tenant dying seised of any mes-
suage holden of the said manor upon that messuage after 
his death. 152 
[T]here is another custom within the said manor, that if 
the best beast of the said tenant be cloigned before the 
seizure of it by the lord or his servant, that then the lord 
hath been accustomed to seize and take the best beast of any 
other being levant et couchant upon the said tenure. 153 
The court held that the second custom "seems to be repug-
nant to the first custom, and is a several custom by itself."154 
It was also adjudged to be "void and unreasonable."155 
Shortly after Blackstone wrote his commentaries, the 
multiple disputes arose over the use of the close at Steeple 
Bumstead in Essex. In the 1795 case of Fitch, 156 the customs 
alleged were "for 'all the inhabitants of a parish to play at all 
kinds oflawful games, sports and pastimes in the close of A. 
at all seasonable times of the year at their free will and plea-
sure[,]'''157 and "for all persons for the time being, being in 
the parish" 158 to do the same. Defendants were charged with 
trespass for playing cricket on the close belonging to plain-
tiff. One of the objections made was "that the customs, 
whether good or bad, are repugnant to each other, and, 
therefore, that the court cannot give judgment on either of 
the special pleas." 159 The court disagreed: 
It would be very strange if one Defendant should plead a 
good plea, and it were found for him, that he should not 
have judgment, according to the justice and truth of the 
case, though the other Defendant should plead a bad 
plea. But why are these customs inconsistent with each 
other? It might happen, that there might be at first a lim-
ited custom and afterwards a more extensive one, and I 
do not see why the second should root up the first, or why 
they might not both exist together, supposing the second 
to be a good one. l60 
As it turned out, as noted in an earlier section, the second 
was held bad as extending to too broad a class of persons. 
In the 1818 case of Badger v. Ford, 161 the conflict was be-
tween "a custom for the lord to grant leases of the waste of 
the manor, without restriction"162 and "by custom of the 
manor, all such tenements had a right of common."163 When 
151. Dyer 199,73 E.R. 440 (1561). 
152. Jd. 
153. Jd. 
154. Jd. at 199-200,73 E.R. at 441. 
155. Jd. at 200, 73 E.R. at 441. 
156. (1795) 2 H Bl 394; [1775-1802] All E.R. 571; 126 E.R. 614. 
157. Jd. at 394; All E.R. at 571; 126 E.R. at 614. 
158. Jd. 
159. Jd. at 397; All E.R. at 573; 126 E.R. at 616. 
160. Jd. at 397-98; All E.R. at 573; 126 E.R. at 616. 
161. 3 B & AId 153, 106 E.R. 618 (1819). 
162. Jd. at 153. 
163. Jd. at 155. 
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leases exercised under the first custom conflicted with the 
rights of commoners under the second, the court found the 
first "bad in point oflaw."I64 On the other hand, in the 1844 
c.ase of Elwood ~. Bul~ock, 165 ~e court found customary 
nghts to hold a faIr consistent With customary rights to erect 
a booth on the highway during such a fair, provided there 
was still room for horses and carts to pass thereon. 
These, th~n, are Blackstone's seven criteria for "good" 
customs, as mterpreted by both contemporaries and later 
courts in England. Since customary rights in land are in 
derogation of co~mon-law rights in land-particularly 
the fundamental nght to exclude others-it makes sense 
for such customary rights to be limited in their exercise. 
Blackstone's criteria present such reasonable limitations. 
Moreover, as appears earlier and later in this Article, most 
courts cite Blackstone as authority for their customary 
law. It is not altogether apparent that they understand 
it, however. 
Custom Exhumed: Oregon and Hawaii Rewrite the Law 
C;ourts have gener~ll~ upheld state legislation purporting 
simply to restate eXlstmg customary public rights to use the 
beaches of the state regardless of private "ownership." In 
~exas, the courts so ~eld, including limited access poten-
tIally through custom m Moody v. White 166 and Arrington v. 
M 167 H hi attox. owever, not ng prepared the property world 
for what the courts in Oregon and Hawaii did to and with the 
law of custom a few years later. Oregon courts "found" a 
customary right without any fact-finding and extended it to 
the entire Oregon coast on behalf of the public at large. Ha-
waii, by comparison, ignored much of its own precedent on 
the rights of native Hawaiians and extended undetennined 
rights of access, worship, and gathering over the lands of the 
entire state, public or private, developed or undeveloped. 
The following sections, in turn, deal with each state's leap 
into the customary unknown. 
Oregon 
The cases that changed the law in Oregon were decided 
against a backdrop of legislation which declared that any 
easement which the public had in or on the beach was vested 
in the state. 168 Based largely on theories of prescriptive 
rights, the state in Oregon ex rei. Thornton v. Hay169 sought 
to prevent the landowners, the Hays, from constructing im-
provements on the dry-sand beach portion of their lot be-
tween the high water line and the upland vegetation line. 
The Hays appealed an adverse judgment below to the state 
supreme court. Instead of deciding the case on the grounds 
~on a~d appealed upon, the Thornton court, sua sponte, de-
Cided It on the basis of custom: 
Because many elements of prescription are present in 
this case, the state has relied upon the doctrine in support 
164. Id. at 153. 
165. 6 Q.B. 383 (1844). 
166. 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). 
167. 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), cen. denied. 493 U.S. 1073 
(1989); see also United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 
F. Supp. 769 (D.V.1. 1974), affd. 529 F.2d 513 (1974). 
168. 16 OR. REV. STAT. §390.61O (2)-(4) (1969). 
169. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
of the decree below. We believe, however, that there is a 
better legal basis for affirming the decree. The most co-
gent basis for the decision in this case is the English doc-
trine of custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies 
only to the specific tract of land before the court, and 
d~ubtful prescriptio.n.cas~s could fill the courts for years 
Wtth tract-by-tract httgauon. An established custom, on 
the other hand, can be proven with reference to a larger 
region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to the south-
ern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.17o 
The court noted that the general public had enjoyed the 
d~y-sand area since the beginning of the state's political 
histOry, and before that "aboriginal inhabitants" had used 
the beach for clam digging and for cooking fires. Further-
more, from t~e earliest times, the general public had as-
sl!m~d that thiS area was part of the public beach, used for 
pICnICS, gathering wood, building fires, and so forth. Local 
officials policed it, and local sanitary crews kept it clean. 
Therefore, the entire dry-sand beach area in the state of Or-
egon was henceforth subject to a public recreational ease-
ment based on the doctrine of custom. It did not matter that 
the custom, declared to be essentially English in nature 
:vas ne~ther "immemorial" nor limited to a town or village~ 
[b]ut It does not follow that a custom, established in fact, 
cannot hav~ regional application and be enjoyed by a 
larger public than the inhabitants of a single village."171 
The .court so found without any court hearing or objective 
findmgs of custom below-the heart of the Blackstonian 
finding of custom according to the seven criteria described 
in the Commentaries. 
With all due respect to the courts of the several states 
which appear to be creating property rights from 
Blackstonian custom, they ignore the basis and essence of 
such custom, at least according to the seven criteria which 
Blackstone describes in his commentaries. Hawaii also 
blithely ignores at least one such criterion in its opinion 
and ignores others-particularly certainty and reasonable-
n~ss, and arguably continuity. It also plays fast and loose 
wl~h the Blackstonian injunction, supported by Coke cen-
tunes before, that it is impossible to derive a right to take 
something from land-know as a profit a pendre-from 
custom. 172 
The Oregon Supreme Court at least makes a stab at going 
through the seven criteria. However, it mistakes the critical 
requirements of reasonableness and certainty, even as de-
scribed in the Commentaries. The court says: 
The fourth requirement, that of reasonableness, is satis-
fied by the evidence that the public has always made use 
of the land in a manner appropriate to the land and to the 
usages of the community .... The fifth requirement, cer-
tainty, is satisfied by the visible boundaries of the dry 
sand area and by the character of the land, which limits 
the use thereof to recreational uses connected with the 
foreshore. 173 
This is not, by any means, what Blackstone meant, nor did 
cases before, contemporary with, and after his time support 
such an interpretation. 
170. Id. at 676. 
171. Id. at 678 n.6. 
172. See infra note 190 and accompanying text; Sullivan, supra note 6, at 
146-47; 12 (I) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (l998),at631-32. 
173. 462 P.2d at 671. 
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Twenty-five years later, in Stevens,174 the Oregon Su-
preme Court revisited customary law, this time explicitly 
holding custom to be a Lucas-exemption background prin-
ciple of state law. There, the town of Cannon Beach refused 
to issue a seawall permit because it would block access to 
the dry-sand beach in derogation of the customary rights of 
the public which the court had established in Thornton. To 
the Stevens' Fifth Amendment inverse condemnation 
(takings) claim, the court responded that the customary law 
of Oregon was a background principle of state property law 
under Lucas and therefore an exception to the Lucas cate-
gorical rule with respect to takings of all economically bene-
ficial use. 175 In both Thornton and Stevens, therefore, the 
right to exclude the public was never a part of the landown-
ers' titles to begin with. Of course, just when and how the 
Hays and other similarly situated landowners were to appre-
hend that their dry-sand beach land was subject to such a 
customary easement, because they all purchased their land 
before the Thornton decision, the court does not really say. 
The Stevens unsuccessfully applied for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. Unremarkably (given his excoriation of en-
vironmental protection in Lucas), Justice Scalia dissented 
from the denial. First taking issue with the Oregon court's 
characterization of its customary law as a Lucas exception, 
Scalia noted that while a state is generally free to define 
property rights under state and not federal law , nevertheless: 
[A] State may not deny rights protected under the Fed-
eral Constitution ... by invoking a nonexistent rule of 
State substantive law. Our opinion in Lucas ... would be 
a nullity if anything that a State court chooses to denomi-
nate "background law" . . . could eliminate property 
rights. 176 
As to application of such a questionable "custom" in 
this case: 
To say that this case raises a serious Fifth Amendment 
takings issue is an understatement. The issue is serious in 
the sense that it involves a holding of questionable con-
stitutionality; and it is serious in the sense that the 
land-grab (if there is one) may run the entire length of the 
Oregon coast. 177 
Justice Scalia focused on the Supreme Court of Oregon's 
decision in McDonald v. Halvorson,178 in which the court 
"revisited the issue of dry-sand beach .... " The McDonald 
court "noted what it called inconsistencies in Thornton" and 
stated that "'nothing in [Thornton] fairly can be read to have 
established beyond dispute a public claim by virtue of 'cus-
tom' to the right to recreational use of the entire Oregon 
coast. "'179 Scalia concluded that: 
There [was] no testimony in this record showing use of 
the narrow beach on the bank of the cove .... The doc-
trine of custom announced in [Thornton] simply does not 
apply to this controversy ... because there is no factual 
predicate for application of this doctrine. 180 
174. 854 P.2d 449, 24 ELR 20913 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 s. Ct. 
1332 (1994). 
175. Id. at 456,24 ELR at 20916. 
176. 114 S. Ct. at 1333. 
177. Id. at 1335. 
178. 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989). 
179. 114 S. Ct. at 1335 (citing McDonald, 780 P.2d at 724). 
180. Id. (emphasis added). 
Scalia suggested that the Lucas categorical rule pre-
vented limitations from being newly legislated or decreed 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In es-
sence, this "new-found 'doctrine of custom' is a fiction,"181 
requiring compensation. 
Hawaii 
Hawaii is a harder, and certainly more sweeping, situation. 
Hawaii presents more difficulty because there is no question 
that some tradition of some customary rights exists, associ-
ated with native Hawaiians from the days of the various 
kingdoms, including gathering, access, and religious cus-
tomary practices. This tradition predates not only statehood, 
but also territorial days and annexation toward the end of the 
19th century. However, in 1858, the state's highest court de-
clared that most, ifnot all, native customary rights had been 
extinguished by a series of acts of the constitutional monar-
chy established earlier in the century. In Oni v. Meek,182 the 
Hawaii Supreme Court rejected a claim of pasturage based 
on pre-l 850 customary rights on the ground that an 1850 
statute, later codified in principle as Hawaii Revised Stat-
utes (H.R.S.) 7-1, enumerated all the rights which tenants 
had in those lands which they did not "own." A logical con-
clusion: all other traditional rights, customary and other-
wise, were terminated. 183 The holding of the court on custom 
is instructive: "[I]t is obvious to us that the custom con-
tended for is so unreasonable, so uncertain, and so repug-
nant to the spirit of the present laws, that it ought not to be 
sustained by judicial authority."184 
Indeed, language seemingly to the contrary in various 
statutes and declarations almost certainly refer to rights, as 
compared to mere usage, other than customary rights in the 
English sense. In fact, in Territory v. Liliuokalani,185 the 
Territorial Supreme Court specifically rejected a broad defi-
nition of such customary rights in favor of one with a 
well-understood meaning as used in conveyances within the 
territory; "reserving however, the people's kuleana 
therein"186 meant the reservations of house lots and taro 
patches or gardens of natives lying within the boundaries of 
the tract granted. 
Both before and after statehood, courts in the main lim-
ited customary law in Hawaii to statutory rights to gather 
certain plant products listed in H.R.S. 7-1. Attempts to ex-
pand such rights by the state supreme court, by permitting 
kamaaina testimony (verbal history by indigenous people) 
to modify seaward land boundaries of private landown-
ers,187 was soundly rejected by the federal district court in 
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii. 188 Finding no credible evi-
dence justifying relocation of the seaward boundary, the 
court observed: 
The Court fails to find any legal, historical, factual or 
other precedent or basis for the conclusions of the Ha-
181. Id. 
182. 2 Haw. 87 (1858). 
183. See Sullivan, supra note 6. 
184. 2 Haw. at 90. 
185. 14 Haw. 88 (1902), also available at 1902 WL 1354, at *1 (Hawaii 
Terr.). 
186. Id. at 95, 1902 WL 1354, at *6-8. 
187. See Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968). 
188. 460 F. Supp. 473 (0. Haw. 1978). 
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waii Supreme Court that, following erosion, the mon?-
ment by which the seaward boundary of seashore land III 
Hawaii is to be fixed is the upper reaches of the waves. 
To the contrary, the evidence introduced in this case 
firmly establishes that the common law, followed by 
both legal precedent and historical practice, fixes the 
high water mark and seaward boundaries with reference 
to the tides, as opposed to the run or reach of the waves 
on the shore. 189 
The district court found that there was no evidence of 
the public use that the state argued ripened into a cus-
tomary right. 
Almost 20 years later the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Pub-
lic Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning 
Commission (PASH),I'J() declared that traditional and cus-
tomary rights of native Hawaiians may be practiced. on pub-
lic and private land, both undeveloped and substantially de-
veloped, anywhere in the state. The court also held that gov-
ernment agencies must consider the effect on such custom-
ary rights in deciding on applic~tions fo~ ~evelopm~nt.~er­
mits. Claiming to build on prevIOus deCISIOns first hmltmg 
customary rights to those specifically enumerated in a stat-
ute,191 the court suggested in dicta that courts could go be-
yond the statutory enumeration on the ground of custom 
where the Hawaiian practice does no harm and can be de-
monstrably shown to have been continued within a certain 
land division. This extension is arguably contrary to the ex-
press holding in Oni. The court later found suc~ custom~ 
rights could in certain circumstances be exercised outside 
such a land division if the custom to do so could be 
proven. 192 Finally, the court opined that ~~stern. notions of 
property law, particularly that of excluslVlty, might no~ be 
applicable in Hawaii, partic~larly in t~e face of.~ con~lct­
ing "customary" right exercised by .natl.ve Hawa~lans: V'! e 
hold that common law rights ordmanly assOCiated With 
tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the 
laws of this state."193 
Granting that Hawaii has a constitutional provision pro-
viding for state protection of ~ll "rights customarily ~d. tra-
ditionally exercised for subSistence, ~~lt,ural a~d .reli~lous 
purposes" limited to ahupuaa (land dlvlSlon) thiS IS stdl ~n 
elevation of custom over common law that has no baSIS 
whatsoever in historical definitions of custom. Further 
granting that Hawaii has a rich tradition of native practices 
some of which rise to the level of custom (as compared to 
mere usage) gets us a bit further, but only a bit. The court 
simply asserts that, contrary to the historical record, custom-
ary practices go beyond those in HRS I-I and were not ex-
tinguished by the various mid-19th century statutes and 
laws that created the "western" concept of property in Ha-
waii which the court derides. 194 The court picks and chooses 
among elements of traditional custom, particularly disre-
189. Id. at 480. 
190. 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995). 
191. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982). 
192. See Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 19?2)(holding 
that Pele (volcano goddess) worshippers could go on pnvate land to 
conduct their worship ceremonies even if outside the ahup~a' a (lan.d 
division upon which they traditionally lived and/or worshipped), If 
the custom exercised so pennitted). 
193. PASH, 903 P.2d at 1269. 
194. "[T]he western concept of exclusivity is not universally applicable 
in Hawaii." Id. at 1268. 
garding or redefining elements of consistency, certainty, 
and reasonableness195 in reaching a decision based on cus-
tomary law that goes far beyond the Oregon cases, "finding" 
customary rights in 20 percent of Hawaii's citizens over ev-
ery square foot of land in the state, whether or not devel-
oped,l96 and regardless of the nature or form of land owner-
ship. It is no wonder that title companies in Hawaii now typ-
ically exclude from their coverage any rights that are or may 
be asserted by native Hawaiians. 
As to whether such new "findings" of customary rights in 
derogation of fundamental "western" concepts of property 
rights could be a taking of property without compensation, 
best to let the court speak for itself: 
[Property owner] argues that the recognition of tradi-
tional Hawaiian rights beyond those established in 
Kalipi and Pele would fundamentally alter its property 
rights. However, [property owner's] argument places 
undue reliance on westem understandings of property 
law that are not universally applicable in Hawaii. More-
over, Hawaiian custom and usage have always been a 
part of the laws of this State. Therefore, our recognition 
of customary and traditional Hawaiian rights ... does not 
constitute a judicial taking. 197 
The Hawaii Supreme Court recently clarified its deci-
sions regarding custom in two decisions. The first is a per 
curiam memorandum opinion, Trustees of the Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs v. Board of Land & Natural Resources of. the 
State of Hawaii. 198 In holding that the state land board faded 
to protect traditional native Hawaiian rights when the Board 
granted a conditional use permit to dredge a channel through 
state land, the court concluded that the Board failed to make 
definiti ve findings or conclusions as to the exercise of native 
Hawaiian rights in the subject area. The court held it was 
necessary for the Board to make express findings as to the 
existence and extent of customary and traditional rights and, 
if a permit to dredge would impair these rights, to determine 
whether such impairment "is justified." The Board had 
noted in its challenged findings that the subject shoreline ar-
eas were used by Hawaiians and others for fishing and pick-
ing shellfish, but that the proposed dredge area was not rich 
in aquatic life and the location of the proposed channel en-
trance was not an especially good spot for fishing, gather-
ing, or other traditional and customary activities by Hawai-
ians. The Board further found that conditions imposed by 
other agency permits would adequately pr?tect and pres.~rve 
access for traditional and customary practices of Hawallans 
to the extent required by law. Despite all this, the court held 
the findings insufficient under its PASH ruling. 
The second is Hawaii v. Hanapi. l99 Alapai Hanapi, a na-
tive Hawaiian, was arrested for trespassing on the 
oceanfront land of his neighbor (a well-known trial lawyer). 
The land is improved with a single-family house. The neigh-
bor was engaged in removing fill from the shore and water, 
illegally deposited without re9uired permits,. appar~ntly to 
develop a boat landing. Hanapl entered the neighbor s prop-
195. Id. 
196. "Depending on the circumstances of each cas.e, onc.e land has 
reached the point of 'full development: .it may be !nCO~slstent to en-
force the practice of traditional Hawal1an gathenng nghts on such 
property." Id. at 1272 (emphasis added). 
197. Id. 
198. No. 19774 (Mar. 12, 1998). 
199. 970 P.2d 485 (Haw. 1998). 
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erty without permission to monitor the "restoration" of the 
beach and wetland, claiming he was exercising native Ha-
waiian rights. Hanapi had made the original complaint, 
partly on the basis that the fill was adversely affecting native 
fishponds adjoining his property, at which he and his family 
claimed to practice traditional religious, gathering, and sus-
tenance activities. When Hanapi refused to leave, the fore-
man supervising the project called the police, and Hanapi 
was arrested for trespassing. He was convicted after trial at 
which he represented himself. 
In sustaining Hanapi' s conviction, the court began by ob-
serving that one limitation on private property "would be 
that constitutionally protected native Hawaiian rights, rea-
sonably exercised, qualify as a privilege for purposes of en-
forcing criminal trespass statutes."200 However, the court 
held that Hanapi had failed to establish that his claimed na-
tive Hawaiian right was a customary and traditional practice 
as required. The court set out three "factors" that Hanapi and 
others claiming such rights must "show": 
• qualify as a native Hawaiian within the PASH 
guidelines (descendants of native Hawaiians who 
inhabited the islands prior to 1778); 
• establish that his or her claimed right is constitu-
tionally protected as a customary or traditional na-
tive Hawaiian practice (need not be enumerated in 
statute or constitution, however); 
• exercise of the right occurred on undeveloped or 
less than fully developed property (not further de-
fined in PASH). 
Applying these factors to Hanapi, the court held that if prop-
erty is zoned and used for residential purposes with existing 
dwellings, improvements, and infrastructure, it is "always 
inconsistent" to permit the practice of traditional and cus-
tomary native Hawaiian rights on such property. This repre-
sents a retreat from earlier language in PASH. In a footnote, 
the court noted "there may be other examples of fully devel-
oped property as well where the existing uses of the property 
may be inconsistent with the exercise of protected native 
Hawaiian rights."201 
The court based its decision not on the above holding, 
however, but rather on the inadequacy of Hanapi' s "founda-
tion in the record connecting the claimed right to a firmly 
rooted traditional or customary native Hawaiian practice. 
Here, Hanapi did not offer any explanation of the history or 
origin of the claimed right."202 Noting that there was suffi-
cient evidence in the record to support Hanapi' s conviction 
for criminal trespass and in the absence of a native Hawaiian 
rights defense, the court affirmed the judgment below find-
ing Hanapi guilty. 
Custom: A Conclusion 
In sum, the law of custom appears to be growing anew. 
States appear to be using custom as a defense against the cat-
egorical taking rule announced in Lucas, by way of one of its 
two exceptions: background principles of state property 
law. The revised doctrine of custom, however, bears little 
resemblance to Blackstone's law of custom, to which both 
the Oregon and Hawaii courts refer: 
200. ld. at 492. 
201. ld. at 495. 
202. ld. 
Because so much of our law is the product of legislation, 
we sometimes lose sight of the importance of custom as a 
source of law in our society. It seems particularly appro-
priate in the case at the bar to look to an ancient and ac-
cepted custom in this state as the source of a rule oflaw. 203 
Custom is arising Phoenix-like from the ashes of 
Blackstone's limitations on the English common law which 
forms the basis of common law in the United States. It arises 
both from renewed interest in the rights of Native Ameri-
cans and from the background principles of state property 
law exception to the doctrine of regulatory taking. In the 
first, custom can provide a means for guaranteeing certain 
rights of native peoples in lands owned (technically held in 
fee simple) by others. The argument that a true customary 
right survives transfer from one owner to another is strong 
(though, as the cases in the foregoing sections demonstrate, 
custom is always subject to control and destruction by legis-
lative act). In the second, custom can provide a basis for a lo-
cal, state, or federal land use regulation which will survive 
constitutional challenge as a taking of property without 
compensation even if it leaves a landowner with no econom-
ically beneficial use of the land. Akin to its twin nuisance 
exception, such a background principle of a state's law of 
property is not a part of the landowner's bundle of owner-
ship sticks to begin with, so that its "taking by regula-
tion"-like the perpetration of a nuisance-is not protected 
by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment. 
Property rights, however, and particularly private-prop-
erty rights, are hedged with restrictions governing such 
rights in land of another like easements, profits, licenses, 
and covenants. One with no right to enter the land of another 
is a trespasser, as is demonstrated by the majority of the land 
cases cited and quoted in the preceding sections (where the 
action was almost always one in trespass against the intruder 
who plead custom and customary rights as a defense). This 
right to exclude is a critical part of American jurisprudence 
with respect to private-property rights. As the American Law 
Institute noted in its Restatement of the Law of Propeny: 
A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has a 
physical relation to the land of a kind which gives a cer-
tain degree of physical control over the land, and an in-
tent so to exercise such control as to exclude other mem-
bers of society in general from any present occupation of 
the land.204 
Another commentator describes the "notion of exclusive 
possession" as "implicit in the basic conception of private 
property."205 The Supreme Court has many times made the 
same point. Thus, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States206 : 
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so uni-
versally held to be a fundamental element of the prop-
erty right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Govemment cannot take without compensation. This is 
not a case in which the Govemment is exercising its 
regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insub-
stantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; 
rather, the imposition ofthe ... servitude ... will result 
in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned 
203. Oregon ex reI. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
204. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §7 (1936). 
205. RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 63 (1985). 
206. 444 U.S. 164, 10 ELR 20042 (1979). 
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marina. And even if the Government physically in-
vades only an easement in the groperty, it must none-
theless pay just compensation. 7 
Again, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA IV Corp. 208: 
Moreover, an owner suffers a special kind of injury 
when a stranger directly invades and occupies the 
owner's property. As [another part ofthe opinion] indi-
cates, property law has long protected an owner's ex-
pectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least 
in the possession of his property. To require, as well, 
that the owner permit another to exercise complete do-
minion literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such 
an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regu-
lation of the use of property, even a regulation that im-
poses affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner 
may have no control over the timing, extent or nature of 
the invasion.209 
Indeed, the right to exclude has achieved international 
status with the 1999 opinion of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in Case ofChassagnou and Others v. France.210 
Before the Court was the French Loi Verdeille211 which pro-
vides for the statutory pooling of hunting grounds. The ef-
fect on the plaintiffs (three farmers) was to force them to be-
come members of a municipal hunters' association and to 
transfer hunting rights to the association, with the result that 
all members of the association may enter their property for 
the purpose of hunting.212 The government of France 
claimed that the interference with the applicants' property 
rights was minor since they had not been deprived of the 
right to use their property and all they lost was the right to 
prevent other people from hunting on their land. 
However, the Court found that while it was "undoubtedly 
in the general interest to avoid unregulated hunting and en-
courage the traditional management of game stocks,',213 
(clearly the purpose of the Lai Verdeille) the interference 
with the applicants' fundamental right to peaceful enjoy-
ment of their land was "disproportionate": 
[N]otwithstanding the legitimate aims of the Lo; 
Verdeille when it was adopted, the Court place the appli-
cants in a situation which upsets the fair balance to be 
struck between protection of the right of property and the 
requirements of the general interest. Compelling small 
landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land so 
that others can make use of them in a way which is totally 
incompatible with their beliefs imgoses a disproportion-
ate burden which is not justified. 4 
Such obvious intrusions on private property-in particular 
the well-documented right to exclude needs-must comply 
with certain restrictions and criteria common to the concept 
of custom. Blackstone provides such criteria, not only as a 
matter of reason, but as a matter of law since he is almost al-
207. Id. at 179-80, 10 ELR at 20046 (citations omitted). 
208. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
209. Id. at 436 (citations omitted; emphasis included). See Callies, supra 
note 5, at 526-29. 
210. 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. (25088/94, 28331195, and 28443195) (Apr. 29, 
1999). 
21l. Law No. 64-696 of July 10, 1964. 
212. Supra note 210, at para. 13. 
213. Id. at para. 79. 
214. Id. at para. 85. 
ways cited in the reported American cases on custom and 
customary law. 
As the discussion in the introductory section of this Arti-
cle demonstrates, the courts usually get it wrong. Of the 
seven criteria set out in the Commentaries, the most critical 
appear to be certainty, reasonableness, and continuity. Con-
trary to the language in the Thornton case from Oregon, rea-
sonableness is not a matter of present use but of original le-
gal unfairness at its inception. Customs that unduly burden 
property rights of the landowner or which favor unduly one 
group or person over others are unreasonable. If a custom 
is reasonable in these terms at its inception, then it is rea-
sonable. Thus the court's statement that "reasonableness is 
satisfied by the evidence that the public has always made 
use of the land in a manner appropriate to the land and to 
the usages of the community"215 is beside the point, irrele-
vant, and wrong. 
The Blackstonian criterion of certainty goes to the clarity 
of the customary practice or right, the restrictive certainty as 
to locale (some legally recognized division like a county, a 
city, a town, or a village) and certainty as to a class of per-
sons or section of the public. The Thornton court's state-
ment that "certainty is satisfied by the visible boundaries of 
the dry sand area and by the character of the land, which lim-
its the use thereof to recreation uses connected with the fore-
shore,,216 is vague as to the first requirement, far too broad 
with respect to the second, and altogether fails to deal with 
the third. 
As to continuity, the court says that a "customary right 
need not be exercised continuously, but it must be exercised 
without an interruption caused by anyone possessing a para-
mount right."217 True for the first part, false for the second 
part. As Blackstone (and the cases) make abundantly clear, 
it is the right of use which must be continuous. The use itself 
goes to evidence of that continuity of right, but the use itself 
is otherwise irrelevant. 
To sum up, American courts cite (appropriately) 
Blackstone when finding custom as a basis for permitting 
what would otherwise be a trespass on private land. Unfor-
tunately, they usually get it so wrong that the basis in cus-
tom must certainly fail. Without another basis for justify-
ing such invasive intrusions on private property, those ex-
ercising such rights are trespassing, and governments that 
permit (or require) such trespass are taking private prop-
erty without compensation contrary to the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution. 
Public Trust and Background Principles 
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that a state 
holds public trust lands, waters, and living resources in trust 
for the benefit of its citizens, establishing the right of the 
public to fully enjoy them for a variety of public uses and 
purposes.218 Implied in this definition are limitations on the 
private use of such waters and land, as well as limitations on 
the state to transfer interests in them, particularly if such 
transfer will prevent public use. Such definitions and duties 
215. 462 P.2d 671,677 (Or. 1969). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. CoASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, supra note 7, at l. 
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analytically flow from the dual nature of title in public trust 
lands and waters. On the one hand, the public has the right to 
use and enjoy the land and water-the res of the trust-for 
such activity as commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and 
related public purposes. This is the so-called jus publicum. 
On the other hand, since according to one source, fully 
one-third of public trust property is in private rather than 
public hands,219 private-property rights exist in many such 
trust lands and water. This is the so-calledjus privatum.22o 
The principal problem, of course, is the extent to which 
the public trust doctrine can result in the elimination of such 
private-property rights absent compensation, contrary to the 
Fifth Amendment. Obviously, any recognized public rights 
in private land would stand on a footing similar to an ease-
ment, leasehold, covenant burden, license, or other recog-
nized private-property right in the land of another: a limita-
tion or restriction on the title of and, usually, use by the land-
owner. In this sense, the public trust represents a category of 
rights which may not have been part of the landowner's title 
to begin with, thereby falling into the "background princi-
ples of state property law" exception to the categorical tak-
ing rule described in Part 1.221 
The taking issue arises most frequently, however, when a 
state court or legislature "re-affirms" the public's trust 
"rights" on private property. This occurs when a state: "I) 
imposes restrictions on privately-held trust lands; 2) re-
quires public access across private land for access to trust 
lands or water; and 3) expands the scope of public activities 
permitted under the guise of public trust rights."222 Most 
public trust lands are submerged, tidal, or "water-flowed." 
This explains why the vast majority of controversies over 
the application of the public trust doctrine involve water 
rights and the use of submerged lands.223 While private land 
use or development thereon is marginal, there is a growing 
tendency of courts to expand the application of the public 
trust doctrine to "dry-sand" and other more useable and 
developable areas. 
What follows briefly summarizes and analyzes the land-
mark cases establishing modem and potentially expansive 
notions of the public trust doctrine. The analysis is followed 
by a discussion of select, relatively recent cases expanding 
the doctrine to "dry land" from traditional submerged and 
waterfront lands, together with a summary of those few 
cases which recently demonstrate limitations on the doc-
trine in the face of takings challenges. As some of these deci-
sions demonstrate, courts are often confronted with a legis-
lative act, usually a state statute designed to protect and con-
serve coastal zones, which purports either to grant or restrict 
rights in land. Application of public trust principles then re-
sults either in voiding all or part of a transfer of public lands 
to a private owner, or the upholding (or not) of a restrictive 
regulatory statute on the ground that most or all of the re-
strictions simply restate public trust limitations on private 
land impressed with such a trust. 
219. [d. at 230. 
220. [d. at 2. 
221. See DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION 
WON'T WORK 101-02 (1994). 
222. [d. at 357. 
223. See, e.g., ARCHER ET AL., PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MAN-
AGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS, supra note 7, and the dozens of 
cases cited therein. See also id. and the extensive table of cases listed 
by category appended to the end of the volume. 
The Modern Classics: Where It All Began 
The undisputed font and source of the modem public trust 
doctrine is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.224 The 
railroad claimed title to 1,000 acres of submerged lands un-
der Lake Michigan (which it proposed to fill and develop) 
stretching for nearly a mile along Chicago's shoreline. It ob-
tained title under a specific fee simple grant from the Illinois 
legislature. Finding that navigable waters and the lands un-
der them were held by the state in trust for the public, the Su-
preme Court held that the state could not conveyor other-
wise alienate them in fee simple, free ofthe public trust im-
pressed upon them. The state could, however, sell small par-
cels of public trust land the use of which would promote the 
public interest (e.g., docks, piers, and wharves), so long as 
this could be done without impairing the public interest in 
the remaining submerged land and water.225 
Because the legislature conveyed the land in fee simple in 
apparent disregard of its public trust responsibilities and the 
trust imposed on such lands, the sale was void.226 The case 
now stands for the proposition that only the jus privatum, as 
compared with the jus publicum, can be transferred by the 
state, and, inversely, that the jus publicum can never be part 
of a private title to property. An example of the kind of pri-
vate use which can be made of public lands comes from 
Idaho in Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. State 
Board of Land Commissioners.227 The Idaho Supreme Court 
approved leasing state lands impressed with a public trust to 
a private club for the construction, maintenance, and use of 
private docking facilities on a bay in a navigable lake. While 
noting extensive experience in California and Wisconsin 
with respect to private use of public trust lands, the court 
held that the lease (not a fee simple transfer) was "not in-
compatible" with the public trust imposed on the property 
"at this time.'022s 
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court expanded the 
physical reach of the public trust doctrine from submerged 
lands under navigable waterways, like Lake Michigan, to all 
lands under waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the 
tides in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi. 229 The Court 
rejected pri vate fee simple titles extending back to pre-state-
hood Spanish land grants that were held by Phillips Petro-
leum and its predecessors for over 100 years, and upon 
which the company had paid taxes as if held in fee simple. 
Instead, the Court held that title to these lands, often ex-
posed for long periods of time, passed to the state of Miss is-
sippi upon its entry into the union, under the "equal footing" 
doctrine.23o According to the Court, "States have the author-
ity to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to 
recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.,,231 A 
strong three-justice dissent, comprised of Justices 
O'Connor, Stevens, and Scalia, expressed alarm that the 
Court's holding "will disrupt the settled expectations of 
landowners not only in Mississippi but in every coastal 
224. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
225. [d. at 450-64. 
226. [d. at 454-55. 
227. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983). 
228. [d. at 1094. 
229. 484 U.S. 469, 18 ELR 20483 (1988). 
230. [d. at 479-82, 18 ELR at 20483-84. 
231. [d. at 479, 18 ELR at 20484. 
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State."232 By substantially expanding traditional public trust 
rights beyond navigable waters and bays immediately ad-
joining them, the decision, argued the dissent, would extend 
the state's public trust interests to tidal, nonnavigable waters 
including bodies remote from and only indirectly connected 
to the ocean or navigable tidal waters. The practical effect 
was that thousands of leaseholders of tidal lands could be 
displaced because over nine million acres of land were clas-
sified as fresh or saline wetlands, arguably now subject to 
the state's control under the public trust doctrine.233 
Extending the Public Trust: Selected Examples 
Perhaps the most famous of the relatively recent case law is 
Orion Corp. v. State. 234 The landowner planned to build a 
residential community on dredged and filled tidelands and 
submerged lands; however, after it purchased the land, the 
state of Washington adopted a series of coastal and tideland 
laws limiting the landowner's use of recreation and 
aquaculture. The landowner claimed the restrictions 
amounted to a taking of property by regulation. 
Applying the then-current federal standard for takings set 
out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York,235 the court held that Orion could have had no invest-
ment-backed expectations with respect to the residential 
development. Because the state held original title to all of 
Washington's shoreline, any transfer of shoreline property 
was impressed with a public trust which, of course, could 
not be alienated. The court, however, noted that the state's 
tideland regulations were more restrictive in terms of pri-
vate land use than would result from reasonable applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine. Therefore, to the extent the 
regulations only prohibited uses that would be prohibited 
under the public trust doctrine, no regulatory taking could 
occur. But to the extent the regulations were more restric-
tive, a regulatory taking would occur if they denied the 
landowner all economically viable use of the property. In-
terestingly, the court foreshadowed the Lucas per se, cate-
gorical test. 
Similarly, a California court, in National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Superior Court of Alpine County,236 rejected a 
takings claim on the ground that the imposition of public 
trust restrictions amounted to a taking of property with-
out compensation: 
Once again we rejected the claim that establishment of 
the public trust constituted a taking of property for which 
compensation was required: "We do not divest anyone 
of title to property; the consequence of our decision will 
be only that some landowners whose predecessors in in-
terest acquired property under the 1870 act will, like the 
grantees in [People v. California Fish, 166 Cal. 576 
(1913)] hold it subject to the public trust."m 
At about the same time as the California and Washington 
supreme courts were declaring public trust rights in private 
232. [d. at 485, 18 ELR at 20486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
233. [d. at 493-94, 18 ELR at 20489. 
234. 747 P.2d 1062, 18 ELR 20697 (Wash. 1987)(en bane), cert. denied, 
486 U.S. 1022 (1988). 
235. 438 U.S. 104,8 ELR 20528 (1978). 
236. 658 P.2d 709, 13 ELR 20272 (Cal. 1983). 
237. [d. at 723, 13 ELR at 20278 (citing City of Berkeley v. Superior 
Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 532, 10 ELR 20394, 
20399 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1980». 
land, the New Jersey courts were expanding the reach of the 
public trust doctrine to dry-sand beach areas in much the 
same way as the Oregon courts had done in Thornton and 
Stevens, but this time using public trust rather than cus-
tom. In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass 'n,238 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the public trust doc-
trine extends to dry-sand beach areas for both access to 
and limited use of the ocean and foreshore (traditional 
public trust areas). 
The bathers' right in the upland sands is not limited to 
passage. Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the 
sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the 
dry [ -] sand area is also allowed. The complete pleasure 
of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent peri-
ods of rest and relaxation beyond the waters' edge .... 
The unavailability of the physical sites for such rest and 
relaxation would seriously curtail and in many situations 
eliminate the right to recreational use of the ocean ... 
where use of dry sand is essential or reasonably neces-
sary for enjoyment of the ocean, the [public trust] doc-
trine warrants the public's use of the upland dry[-] sand 
area subiect to an accommodation of the interests of the 
owner.2r9 
In New Jersey, there is a consistent pattern of permitting 
public access to beaches despite attempts by landowners, 
either public or private, to prevent such access to their 
beaches.240 The public trust doctrine has been applied to all 
manner of property to prevent such development as the 
construction of schools on public park land and the pres-
ervation of national monuments. 241 Also, New York 
found public trust to be a principle basis for statutory land 
use restorations on private property contained in the Long 
Island Pine Barrons Protection Act.242 These rulings, 
however, are somewhat tangential to the takings thrust of 
this Article. 
Limiting the Public Trust: Selected Examples 
Not all courts have been so quick as to accept extensions or 
declarations of public trust as a basis for restricting the use 
of private property in the face of takings challenges. Aside 
from the limitation on regulations which go beyond public 
trust principles, as in the Orion case discussed in the previ-
ous section, the Maine Supreme Court has held that attempts 
to expand "traditional" public trust access for purely recre-
ational purposes may be challenged as takings. In Bell v. 
Town of Wells Beach,243 the court held that attempts to tra-
verse private lands to reach public land for recreational pur-
poses in accordance with the state's Public Trust and 
Intertidal Land Act resulted in a taking of private property 
without compensation. Traditional public trust access pur-
poses, according to the court, would be for fishing, fowling, 
and navigation. 
238. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
239. [d. at 365. 
240. See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881, 
12 ELR 20073 (N.J. 1981); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 
571 (N.J. 1978); Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 372 A.2d 1133 
(N.J. 1977). 
241. See Johanna Searle, Private Property Rights Yield to the Environ-
mental Crisis: Perspectives on the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.c. L. 
REV. 897,909 (1990). 
242. WJF Realty v. New York, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1998). 
243. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
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Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, while reaf-
firming the public's right to use the intertidal zone for fish-
ing, fowling, and navigation, refused to expand statutory 
declarations of public trust to pennit so much as access 
across private land to reach such intertidal lands in Opinion 
of the Justices. 244 In holding proposed legislation to reserve 
such rights of way a probable taking, the court said: 
The permanent physical intrusion into the property of 
private persons, which the bill would establish, is a 
taking of property within even the most narrow con-
struction of that phrase possible under the Constitu-
tions of the Commonwealth and the United States .... 
The interference with private property here involves a 
wholesale denial of an owner's right to exclude the 
public. If a possessory interest in real property has any 
meaning at all it must include the general right to ex-
clude others?45 
To the same effect is the opinion of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court in Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of 
Coastal Beaches).246 In responding to a new statute that pro-
vided for access to tide-flowed public trust shoreline across 
abutting private land, the court said: 
When the government unilaterally authorized a perma-
nent, public easement across private lands, this consti-
tutes a taking requiring just compensation .... 
... Because the bill provides no compensation for the 
landowners whose property may be burdened by the 
general recreational easement established for public use, 
it violates the prohibition contained in our State and Fed-
eral Constitutions against the taking of private property 
for public use without just compensation. Although the 
State has the power to permit a comprehensive beach ac-
cess and use program by using its eminent domain power 
and compensating private property owners, it may not 
take property rights without compensation through leg-
islative decree.247 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court drove home those 
advisory points in Purdie v. Attorney General.248 There, 40 
beachfront property owners sued the state alleging a taking 
of their property when the state established a statutory 
boundary line defining public trust lands further inland 
from the mean high watermark. The language of the court 
is instructive: 
244. 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974). 
245. [d. at 568. 
246. 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994). 
247. [d. at 611. 
248. 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999). 
Having determined that New Hampshire common law 
limits public ownership of the shorelands to the mean 
high water mark, we conclude that the legislature went 
beyond common law limits by extending public trust 
rights to the highest high water mark .... Property rights 
created by common law may not be taken away legisla-
tively without due process of law. Because [the state 
statute] unilaterally authorizes the taking of private 
shore land for public use and provides no compensation 
to landowners whose property has been appropriated, it 
violates [the state constitution] and the Fifth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution against the taking of property 
for public use without just compensation .... Although it 
may be desirable for the State to expand public beaches to 
cope with increasing crowds, the State may not do so 
without compensating affected landowners.,,249 
Custom and Public Trust as Background Principles 
After Lucas: A Tentative Summing Up 
What rule or standard can be carved from these few cases 
that could be applied to the law of takings after Lucas? 
Clearly, some members of the Supreme Court are con-
cerned about the damage to fee simple titles resulting from 
sudden declarations or physical extensions of the public 
trust doctrine. Simultaneously, a minority of the Court is 
concerned about the sudden "finding" of customary rights 
exercisable by the general public over large areas of land. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the Court appears unwilling 
to review such sudden shifts in favor of public rights at the 
cost of private restriction on regulatory taking theories, 
even after Lucas. 
Without federal cases to the contrary, it seems clear that 
government has available public trust, like custom-hope-
fully real custom, not custom that is custom-made to fit a 
particular fact pattern-as a "background principle" de-
fense to a regulatory taking, even if the landowner is left 
with no economically beneficial use of the relevant parcel. 
Of course, as intimated by Washington's Orion court, 
statutes that prohibit more uses than would be prohib-
ited under the application of public trust principles will 
have to be defended under another doctrine or they may 
result in regulatory takings. Presumably, the same is 
true with respect to custom. The latter will often result 
in landowner difficulties in excluding those entitled to 
exercise customary rights from private property, but 
only rarely should the application of custom result in 
undevelopable land. 
249. [d. at 447 (citing Opinion of the Justices, supra note 246) (emphasis 
added). 
